

WARLORDS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

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ABSTRACT

WARLORDS AND DEMOCRATIZATION, by Matthew R. Lewis, 148 pages.

There have been many changes to the national security strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. One of the most important changes has been the role that the democratic peace theory plays in achieving global peace and prosperity. As a result of this change, U.S. strategies stopped trying to contain communism and sought ways to enlarge the community of democratic states. These new strategies included the objectives of stabilizing and rebuilding failed states, more commonly known as “nation building” and “democratization.” As a result of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, national leaders reemphasized the importance of nation building and democratization, and linked the success of these missions directly to the national security of the United States.

However, recent U.S. experiences with democratization in failed states demonstrate the complex nature of these missions. Democratization strategies in these countries have been complicated by the existence of strongly armed factions and politically charged leaders known as “warlords.” These warlords control many instruments of power and play a critical role in the ultimate objective of creating stable democratic government. This research studies warlords from a theoretical perspective and recommends that interventions adopt a strong approach with respect to warlords. Democratization strategies for a failed state should only proceed with the warlords and their violent factions removed from power. This paper then describes democratic transitions and the changeover from a realist strategy to an idealist strategy in order to consolidate democratic reforms.

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ACRONYMS

I.C.	International Community
IR	International Relations
INSS	Institute for National Strategic Studies
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War. This is a generic term used by all of the U.S. Armed Services. However, the U.S. Army normally refers to these missions as Stability and Support Operations (SASO.)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organizations
NSS	National Security Strategy
SRSP	Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party. The communist party of Somalia under Siad Barre.
SOAR	Special Operations Aviation Regiment.
SNA	Somali National Alliance. Mohamed Farah Aideed's political party and major representative body for the Habr Gidr clan.
U.N.	United Nations
UNITAF	United Task Force. The U.S. led coalition into Somalia that formed Operation Restore Hope. The failure of UNOSOM I to get relief supplies into the country spurred the U.N. to adopt a much stronger military force in U.N. Resolution 794.
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia. There were two UNOSOM missions. UNOSOM I was established in U.N. Resolution 751 on 24 April 1992. UNOSOM II was established in Resolution 814 on 26 March 93 but did not officially assume these duties until 5 May 93.
U.S.	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The first chapter of this research is an introduction to the problem of democratization and warlords. It is broken down into three sections. The first describes the development of the post cold-war international environment and explains its effect on the national security strategy (NSS) of the United States (U.S.) The second section explains the issue of self-determination and the pressures that human identity places on state governments. To illustrate state failure, the second section describes the recent rise and fall of Somalia and Afghanistan. The third and final section of this chapter provides a list of the key definitions, assumptions, and limitations associated with this research.

The Development of the Post Cold-War Security Strategy

Roughly ten years ago the geopolitical security environment experienced a significant change that would greatly impact almost every corner of the world. The long-standing feud between capitalism and communism evaporated, leaving the U.S. as the sole surviving superpower. The demise of the communist regime in Russia and the other authoritarian governments of Eastern Europe produced a wave of new democracies throughout the globe. In the opening to *Democracy and Democratization*, Geraint Parry wrote, “With the collapse of the former communist and authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America many heralded the triumph of liberal democracy.”¹ The relatively peaceful transition of many countries to democracy and the free market buoyed the spirits of liberal idealists, and called into the question the direction the U.S. should follow in its future security strategy.

For approximately fifty years following the end of World War II, the U.S. security strategy primarily focused on containing the armed threat posed by the manifested expansion of communist doctrine. To support its fight against the spread of communism, the U.S. developed relationships with other noncommunist states; some whom had troubling issues with regard to human rights. However, the stability of these states and their strong opposition to communism were more important than if their governments were democratic and practiced a respect for human rights.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. began to reconsider how its security strategy should continue the advancement of peace, economic prosperity, and human rights. While the debate raged over which direction the new security strategy should follow, a whole new set of threats began to emerge. The result of the dismantling of many authoritarian regimes produced a resurgence of violent ethnic conflicts and internal state instability. Previously suppressed conflicts led to fierce hostilities and terrible human tragedies such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, and famine, and eventually reached a level that overwhelmed some states' ability to restrain or control this violence.

To mitigate this rising trend, the U.S. armed forces became involved in many military operations other than war (MOOTW) around the globe. These operations encompassed nearly the entire spectrum of conflict with missions ranging from humanitarian assistance to full-scale combat raids and attacks.² While the military's actions may have been the most visible element during these interventions, these missions involved the coordinated efforts of many national and international agencies united in the goal of crisis resolution. These efforts targeted the immediate relief of human suffering and the establishment of a stable and secure environment to support

national reconciliation. However, the strategic objectives of many of these interventions quickly expanded to encompass the much broader goals of a new and evolving NSS. The stabilization efforts led by the U.S. did not stop simply at crisis resolution but began to encompass a wider set of tasks that included ethnic reconciliation, disarmament, and economic reconstruction. In weak or failed states, this systematic process of rebuilding the state infrastructure became known as “nation building.” While some regarded the military involvement in these activities as “mission creep,” many U.S. leaders regarded nation building, economic development, and democratization as the key elements to achieve a lasting international peace.

The New National Security Strategies: Democratic Enlargement and American Internationalism

Democratization, one of primary pillars of U.S. national security, began rising to a new level of importance during the Clinton administration of the early 1990s. More recently, President Bush and his administration have also made it clear that spreading democracy and a free market around the world is in our national security interests. Anthony Lake, the national security advisor for President Clinton, said it best during a speech at John Hopkins in 1993. He said, “Spreading democracy serves our interests because democracies tend not to abuse their citizens’ rights or wage war on one another.”³ This concept was formally developed into President Clinton’s NSS and was commonly referred to as “Democratic Enlargement.” It led to the military, diplomatic, and economic interventions into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the Clinton years. Although the two administrations differ in their political ideologies, Clinton and Bush both describe U.S. national interests with nearly the same principles and values.

The latest NSS released by the Bush administration in September 2002 reemphasized America's commitment to the enlargement of free and democratic states in its effort to consolidate peace and security around the globe. It directly addressed the dangers of failing or failed states, and the need "to actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world."⁴

Although both strategies envision national security through the policy of actively promoting democratic states, there are still some significant differences between the Clinton and Bush policies. Clinton's strategy of Democratic Enlargement seemed to be largely based on the "idealist" or Wilsonian concepts of liberal democracy. Generally, idealists perceive man as inherently good and that the natural state of man is peaceful. Idealists embrace an optimistic or "ideal" outlook of man and advocate a foreign policy based on the advancement and protection of universal human rights and individual liberty. Idealists, like former President Woodrow Wilson, perceive violent conflict to be an aberration of the natural state of man, and that wars result from small groups of bad men or bad states. From an idealist perspective, interventions into countries, such as failed states, were moral crusades aimed at rescuing the people held hostage by the aggressive actions of these evildoers and restoring peace and justice in the country. Democratization, by force if necessary, seemed to be the "right" policy for the world's most powerful liberal democracy.

Conservatives, on the other hand, have a much more pessimistic view of man. In their opinion, man is inherently bad and without societal controls would descend to his natural state of anarchy. They tend to have a more pragmatic or "realist" view of international relations (IR.) Realists see greed and aggression as an inherent quality of all

men. Therefore, the foreign policy of a realist focuses on preserving peace through strong military deterrence and a balance of power arrangement between states. Whereas idealists desire military interventions for the altruistic purpose of spreading freedom and democracy to all people, realists recommend military interventions only when necessary to defeat a threatening enemy or to preserve the international balance of power.

As Clinton pursued his policy of Democratic Enlargement, many criticized nation-building interventions. They claimed that these operations carried open-ended objectives and pursued lofty idealist goals that were at very best supporting only our humanitarian interests. They argued against the U.S. participation in the expensive and risky business of nation building in regions with little or no relevance to the true national security interests of the U.S. This was particularly evident in the debate regarding the risks and benefits of investing American resources in nation building operations, especially with regard to the public's willingness to accept casualties. In a critical review of the Clinton foreign policy, Gary Dempsey and Roger Fontaine wrote:

One lesson [from the 1990s] is that nation building is a fool's errand when the American people are unprepared to sacrifice the blood and treasure of their countrymen in a place they consider strategically unimportant; that is, nation building totally unattached from national self-interest . . . [and] . . . an ambitious nation-building program is not a sufficient condition to transform a country into a self-sustaining, democratic member of the family of nations.⁵

Despite campaigning against nation building,⁶ the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 forced newly elected President Bush to reconsider his position. Following this tragedy, the new NSS of the Bush administration released in September 2002 introduced what scholars call the strategy of "American Internationalism." This strategy takes into account the impact that weak, rogue, or failing

states have on U.S. national security. These unstable states may harbor radical, nonstate actors that can now directly threaten the U.S. in ways that were once limited to only strong states. In the age of advanced technologies and information proliferation, maniacal dictators and obscure, terrorist organizations can now use failing or weak states to research, organize, and train for acts of terror with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in order to achieve their goals. “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.”⁷

WMD present a very real threat that, in the absence of strict state controls, may fall into the hands of radical or rogue elements. The fear of WMD employed by suicidal radicals operating in failed states was driven home to America as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks. The attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center buildings and damaged the Pentagon left America in disbelief but, nonetheless, resolved to deal with this new threat. In the ensuing intervention into Afghanistan, America uncovered plans for future terrorist attacks involving WMD. By using the failed state shell of Afghanistan, Islamic fundamentalist groups trained and prepared to destroy targets within the continental U.S. Because of these threats, the U.S. could no longer ignore failed states. It, therefore, became in our national interest to restore or rebuild these failed states using a democratic model. However, this interest was no longer in the idealist sense a mission that we ought to do, but in the realist sense what we must do to in order to bring about peace and security.

Democratic Peace Theory

American Internationalism and Democratic Enlargement both adhere to the principles of the “democratic peace theory,” which states that liberal democracies give nations the greatest chance at domestic stability and global peace. Democratic nations gain domestic stability through fundamental, core values regarding human rights, respect for individuals, and political freedom. Likewise, according to many IR theorists, liberal democracies seem to have overcome the realist principles that previously guided state behavior (international anarchy, the security dilemma of states, and the balance of power.) According to social scientist Michael Doyle, democracies do not go to war with other democracies.

Although the validity of the democratic peace theory is still debated by historians and social scientists, it remains one of the pillars of U.S. national security. Unfortunately, democracy is very difficult for many societies, especially those racked by ethnic strife and distrust. Strong and stable democracies are not just born overnight and young democracies often revert back to an authoritarian style of government. In fact, according to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder:

[Democracies] more typically go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratization suffers reversals. In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.⁸

Despite the apparent instability of young democracies, the long-term prospects for peace and stability throughout the globe by liberal democratic governments seem much more promising than authoritarian governments. And with the recent terrorist attacks, the U.S.

interest in supporting interventions that pursue democratization is perhaps more clear now in terms of combating real threats to national security as opposed to a strategy based solely on our humanitarian interests.

However, the process of transforming failed states is still an issue of great debate. Building durable democratic nations out of failed states is a challenging task. It involves the tangible aspects of governmental institutions and economic infrastructure, and the intangible aspects of culture and education that will support democracy. In terms of designing an operational strategy for nation building, the specific tasks and length of time for a democratic transition to manifest itself into a mature, self-sustaining democracy are different for every country. The effects of culture and regional history on the democratization process prevent a complete strategic template or prescription for nation building that works in all countries. For example, one would expect a different democratization strategy for former Soviet style republics found in Eastern Europe than for post-colonial failed states in Africa and Asia. Underlying this whole process of nation building is the problem with national identity and self-determination, the very basis of the nation-state system.

Self-Determination and the Nation-State System

In many ways, the entire question of developing successful strategies for nation building hinges on the more fundamental issue of national loyalty and the idea of self-determination by a people as the precursor for nation-state creation. Following World War I, and the break up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, national determination was the principle used by the League of Nations to allocate territory for a whole group of new nation-states in Europe. Similarly, after World War II, the former

empires of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany began returning much of their colonial territory in Africa and Asia to the indigenous populations in a wave of decolonization. By 1960, says Leon Gordenker, “The idea [of self determination] had so many firm adherents that the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly was able to adopt a resolution, by an overwhelming majority, characterizing self-determination as a right of peoples.”⁹ The principle of self-determination now seemed the legal right of people, and its denial by any government a breach of peace.

The reality of applying this doctrine was obviously much more complicated. The territorial jigsaw puzzle of Europe after World War I fell well short of reuniting all national identities into single states. Germans still lived in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Hungarians found themselves in the new state of Yugoslavia. And if diplomats encountered difficulties dividing up Europe by the principle of self-determination, what occurred in Asia and Africa diverged even farther from this idea of one nation, one state. The Imperial European nations created many of the new states in Africa and Asia by simply turning old colonial borders into formal state borders. The old colonial borders were according to Gordenker “established mainly for the convenience of European conquerors, and slashed across clans and families, nations and tribes, with no regard for social existence.”¹⁰ In most of these new states, the nascent governments tried to create a national loyalty, usually by applying force or threat of force directly or indirectly against any ethnic group seeking self-determination or political accommodation within the state. Authoritarian dictatorships soon developed in many of these states partially from a need to control these ethnic sentiments. The heavy-handed policies to keep the state together eventually spawned ethnic warfare and religious radicalism and catapulted some states

toward collapse. As the state disintegrated, various political groups and individuals attempted to seize power, territory, and resources within the country. In his book on self-determination, Gordenker goes on to say that, “Events of the past decade have now impressed upon even the most casual observer of world politics that ethnonationalism constitutes a major and growing threat to the political stability of most states.”¹¹ The whole concept of self-determination and statehood used by the International Community (I.C.) to resolve conflict was now the justification for violence and civil war in these states.

The Rise of Warlords in Post-Colonial Failed States

The problems of self-determination and ethnic identity affected many states following the collapse of Soviet Communism. In some countries the internal ethnic tension was resolved peacefully in the dissolution of the state into smaller nation-states. However, in many other states, especially post-colonial states, these internal pressures eroded the state’s authority and triggered extremely violent and bloody civil war. The ethnic civil wars led in some cases to complete state collapse and the division of power among individuals commonly referred to as “warlords.” The warlords converted the resources of the state into an exhaustive conflict of seemingly endless violence. In the case of failed states, much of the state’s physical infrastructure and fundamental societal institutions lay in ruins. In two states in particular, Somalia and Afghanistan, the chaos and violence of the warlord struggle reached a level that convinced the U.S. to intervene with military force.

The short-term objectives of these military interventions were different in Somalia and Afghanistan. In Somalia, the military intervention was initially used to secure food

shipments for famine relief that were being confiscated by the feuding warlords. In Afghanistan, the U.S. employed military force to destroy the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the brutally repressive Taliban regime that supported that network. Although the U.S. was generally successful in its short-term objectives in both interventions, there had to be a long-term solution in order to prevent future problems from developing in the lawless environment of these failed states. This long-term strategy then became known as nation building, or more appropriately state building, which centered on ethnic reconciliation, democratization, and economic reconstruction.

In both Somalia and Afghanistan, the nation-building strategy had military and civilian agencies working with the same band of warlords that had caused the civil war and state collapse. In an attempt to avoid armed confrontations with the warlords, this strategy tried a series of incentives and negotiations to persuade warlords to cooperate with the nation-building process. However, this strategy seemed to fail in Somalia, and it appears that there is a resurgence of warlord rhetoric that is undoing the peaceful momentum in Afghanistan today. The real question then becomes, “How do you do this business of nation building with warlords?” Recent interventions in Somalia and Afghanistan are good examples for examining the relationships between state collapse, warlords, and nation building.

The Roots of Statehood in Somalia and Afghanistan and the Descent into Chaos

Afghanistan

In addition to having a deeply rooted religious and tribal culture, Afghanistan was heavily influenced by British state interests. British involvement in portions of

Afghanistan stemmed from its holdings in India and led to three separate armed conflicts against indigenous Afghani tribes to protect India's northwestern border. By the later part of the nineteenth century, British control of Afghanistan extended to most parts of the country.

Afghanistan was not finally consolidated into a modern version of a state until the leadership of Abdur Rahman Khan, "The Iron Amir," who led the country from 1880-1901. With British support, Abdur used various measures to control the strong ethnic tribes. He soundly defeated a variety of rebellions and followed the victories with harsh punishment, executions, and deportation of his opponents. To defeat the Pashtun strongholds in the south, he forcibly transplanted many ethnic Pashtuns into non-Pashtun areas in the north, and created a system of provincial governorates that were different than traditional tribal boundaries. Provincial governors had a great deal of power in local matters, and an army was placed at their disposal to enforce tax collection and suppress dissent. During Abdur's reign, tribal organizations began to erode as provincial government officials allowed land to change hands outside the traditional clan and tribal limits.¹² To prevent further British incursions into Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman was forced to accept many controversial territorial arrangements, to include the Durand line, which today still divides the Pashtun tribe into portions belonging to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan achieved its full political and economic independence from Britain after the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919.¹³ For almost fifty years following independence, Afghanistan struggled to discover its national identity through a series of monarchical style governments, which were eventually overthrown by a coalition of

disaffected tribal militias and religious authorities. The principles in the political and judicial reforms by several of Afghanistan's rulers during this period, such as Amanullah and Zahir Shah, resembled many of the same western European values. However, Afghanistan was still firmly grounded in Islamic law and had a tendency to maintain repressive policies. Democratic reforms were short-lived in the parliamentary monarchy of the 1960s and 1970s and died out with the rise of communism in 1978. Despite nine years of direct military assistance by the Soviet Army, there continued to be an unending pattern of violence between government forces and religious opposition groups. Soviet troops left Afghanistan in early 1989, but their exit did little to end the civil war between the ethnic tribes. These tribal wars flared up as soon as the Soviets withdrew and resulted in the complete destruction of any remaining central governmental structure.

Somalia

Somalia was different than Afghanistan in that three European states (France, Britain, and Italy) claimed some portion of territory in Somalia. However, the political and economic development of Somalia was mostly a result of British and Italian colonial influence, not French. Prior to World War II, Britain controlled most of northern Somalia and Italy most of southern Somalia. Following World War II, and after disagreements by the Allied Council Of Foreign Ministers on the disposition of Somalia, the U.N. Security Council decided on a joint ten-year arrangement between the British Protectorate of the north (known as British Somaliland) and Italian trusteeship of the south (Italian Somaliland.) The intent of these relationships was to prepare Somalia for independence within the ten-year period. The ten-year period leading up to 1960 was a relatively peaceful time characterized by education and political development in a mostly

democratic fashion. The Italian trusteeship granted Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in political education and self-government that was not afforded to British Somaliland, which still used British colonial administrators in key positions.

In 1960, the two territories merged and began the difficult process of national integration with Italian Somaliland somewhat better prepared.¹⁴ The period following independence was initially very promising. A history of Somalia on the Library of Congress website states:

During the nine-year period of parliamentary democracy that followed Somali independence, freedom of expression was widely regarded as being derived from the traditional right of every man to be heard. The national ideal professed by Somalis was one of political and legal equality in which historical Somali values and acquired Western practices appeared to coincide. Politics was viewed as a realm not limited to one profession, clan, or class, but open to all male members of society. The role of women, however, was more limited. Women had voted in Italian Somaliland since the municipal elections in 1958. In May 1963, by an assembly margin of 52 to 42, suffrage was extended to women in former British Somaliland as well. Politics was at once the Somalis' most practiced art and favorite sport. The most desired possession of most nomads was a radio, which was used to keep informed on political news. The level of political participation often surpassed that in many Western democracies.¹⁵

In this era, Somalia seemed to be on a very promising course of democratic development. However, as Somalia matured there were three divisive issues that would eventually destroy the state. The first issue was Somalia's desire to demonstrate self-reliance and remove the vexing stigma of the subjugation by the European colonial powers. This led to the political labeling of some parties as puppets of the "imperialists." In addition, there was the idea that it would be better able to provide for its security by establishing dealings with both the Western powers and the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union signed agreements with Somalia for military and economic development. The Soviet-Somali military training included indoctrination of senior

Somali military officers in the Marxist ideology and communism doctrine that ran counter to the free, democratic principles of the Western style government.

The second issue revolved around the Pan-Somalia matter. In previous territorial arrangements by Britain and Italy, portions of Somalia lay in Ethiopia and Kenya. Somali irredentism was politically popular and the debate over moderation versus militant action began to take shape. Even during the initial integration of the British and Italian protectorates, all parties agreed to enshrine the following statement within the new Somali constitution, "The Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of all territories." This issue would eventually lead to war with Kenya and Ethiopia with disastrous consequences for Somalia. The failed wars with Ethiopia and Kenya ruined the fragile economy, eroded confidence in the government, and hurt Somali national morale.

The last issue was the difficulty with clan identity. Somali politics were largely based on a balance of power between the ethnic clans. When issues of election fraud and financial mismanagement erupted in March 1969, the country began to collapse. Upset by tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and misrule, Major General Siad Barre led a coup d'état and installed a Marxist dictatorship in October 1969. Siad Barre banned clan affiliations, all political parties except the SRSP (Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party), and any form of elitism.

Somali socialism followed a slightly different form of government than Soviet Communism. It was based on three basic principles: Marxism, Islam, and community development by self-reliance. Despite ties to the Soviet Union, Siad Barre attempted to

strengthen ties with the U.S. in 1980 as a pragmatic move to increase aid and influence with the West.

Although he terrorized ethnic groups to drop their tribal identities, Siad Barre's authoritarian dictatorship did little to abolish clan identity or establish a durable state government. War into Kenya and Ethiopia to reclaim ethnic Somalis would only exacerbate the problem. Siad Barre was soundly defeated in the war with Ethiopia in 1977-1978 to reclaim the Ogaden region, and these defeats further increased dissent in his domestic agenda. In the late 1980s International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms forced a devaluation of the country's currency and sent the economy into turmoil. Siad Barre resorted to a force known as the Red Berets to restore order. The Red Berets persecuted dissenting clans in a wave of indescribable horror. They adopted genocidal policies towards three of Somalia's major clan families. In 1989, when a group of intellectuals known as the Manifesto Group called for the resignation of Siad Barre, he sentenced them and their families to death.

By July 1990, southern Somalia was embroiled in a violent civil war, northern Somaliland had declared independence, and Siad Barre had fled the country. Clan warlords quickly pilfered all city and state resources, converting them into cash or other means that supported their hostile campaigns against the other warlords. Mogadishu, the former capital of Somalia and once a fairly modern African city, degenerated into a chaotic environment that I can describe from personal experience as a scene from a Mad Max film. One example of the rampant looting I witnessed in Mogadishu was the pillaging of all copper cabling assets. The warlords ripped apart electrical generating

facilities, snatched transmission lines, and literally tore the copper wiring out of building walls to be sold later on the market for weapons and ammunition.

State Collapse and Intervention

There are many factors that contributed to the collapse of Afghanistan and Somalia. The most influential of these factors was ineffective dispute settlements, superpower positioning, and violent civil wars. First, the central governments' repressive measures to settle disputes between ethnic groups by forcing citizens to embrace a national identity only further reinforced these ethnic divisions. Instead of adopting a national identity, the affected ethnic groups began to plot revenge against the government. Second, the cold-war competition for power and influence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union further exacerbated this ethnic power struggle. Military assistance by both superpowers, which provided arms and munitions to both the central governments and the opposition groups, further destabilized the countries. Third, the repressive central governments eventually imploded and both states collapsed. The ensuing violent civil wars between ethnic tribes and clans left both countries in ruins. Throughout this period, a handful of U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) intervened with a limited humanitarian agenda but offered little hope for resolving either crisis. Conflict resolution would only come as a result of a comprehensive economic, political, and military plan.

Even after the states collapsed, the I.C. did not respond immediately with great support to help either country. It required a considerable regional disaster and an issue of state security to compel a major intervention. In Somalia, international intervention did not occur until after the state collapsed and the ensuing chaos prevented relief workers

from delivering humanitarian supplies to the famine stricken population. In Afghanistan, the I.C. ignored the collapse of the state and rise of the Taliban, a radical Islamic group, until the terrorist attacks on the U.S.

Although the interventions in Somalia and Afghanistan were for different reasons, neither began with the holistic intent of the U.S. or the U.N. to rebuild either country. In Somalia, the nation building strategy did not begin until almost ten months after the first U.N. intervention to deal with the famine. In Afghanistan, there were some indications of a rebuilding program or a limited nation-building campaign. However, the five-year investment into reconstruction had more to do with establishing U.S. credibility in the intervention than nation building. Many in the central Asian region were skeptical of the U.S. intentions to bring stability to Afghanistan when it had contributed to destabilizing the country under Soviet control. Therefore, the five-year plan was not a holistic nation-building strategy for Afghanistan but a demonstration of American good will. Consequently, many realize today that it will take a new strategy, a longer vision, and many more resources than were originally designated to help the Afghani people towards a stable democracy.

The requirements and complexities of nation building seem to only become apparent after intervention. The success of nation building interventions into failed states, such as Somalia and Afghanistan, requires a broad, long-term strategy as opposed to the short-term strategy of stability. The retroactive adoption of these broader objectives can be clearly observed in the Somalia intervention. The initial objectives of UNOSOM I (U.N. Operations in Somalia, August 1992 through December 1992) and UNITAF (Unified Task Force, December 1992 through May 1993) were limited. The objectives

were only to provide security and humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia suffering from a famine that, according to Ken Allard, had already killed more than a half a million people by early 1992.¹⁶ On 5 May 1993, the mission in Somalia officially changed and was renamed UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II had the much broader task of maintaining a stable and secure environment, encouraging political reconciliation, rebuilding Somalia's infrastructure, and eventually establishing a democratic government. The command and control transferred to the U.N. but the U.S. maintained an active presence and heavily influenced policies in the region. The ambitious objectives of UNOSOM II reflected the new foreign policy outlined by President Clinton's Democratic Enlargement strategy. Interventions were no longer simply concerned about state stability, containment, or disaster relief but actively promoting the growth of liberal democracy.

However, many in the Clinton administration did not realize the complexity of transitioning to a democratic Somalia and they did not appreciate the capabilities of the regional warlords. The risks warlords posed to nation building were not fully appreciated by either the public or the U.S. political establishment until 3 October 1993. On this date, a massive firefight erupted between U.S. Special Operations Forces (comprised of Rangers, Delta Force operators, and helicopters belonging to 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) and the local militia under General Aideed. During the fighting, an independent media source captured on film the remains of a U.S. soldier being dragged wantonly through the streets of Mogadishu. The aftermath of the firefight left 18 American dead and 76 wounded elite soldiers and, as a result, persuaded the U.S. to rather quickly abandon all nation-building activities in Somalia. The U.S. delayed the withdrawal of its soldiers until March 1994; just long enough to provide political cover

for the retreat. Consequently, the term nation building became taboo and members of the Clinton administration refrained from any use of the term in later interventions into Haiti and Bosnia.¹⁷

Nearly ten years later, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan resembles many aspects of the Somali intervention. There are similarities in the operating environments of Somalia and Afghanistan and the goals of the U.S. intervention strategy. The operating environments in Afghanistan and Somalia were both devoid of any functioning modern state institutions, and were left in ruins by civil wars that had destroyed nearly their entire infrastructure. Afghanistan was also plagued by the same historical animosity between ethnic groups that resulted in the armed power struggle between ethnic warlords and ad hoc clan alliances. Afghanistan, underdeveloped politically and economically like Somalia, built its societal structures following state collapse around ethnic clans and warlord leaders. A recent graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) serving in Afghanistan said:

Afghanistan is a larger, more dangerous, and more devastated version of Bosnia. Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims are replaced with Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Turkmen. Obviously there is a world of difference culturally from Bosnia, but the fact is that we are on a nation-building/ peacekeeping mission while fighting an insurgency in some areas.¹⁸

In addition to the operating environment, the strategy in Afghanistan resembles the same principles that the U.S. and U.N. strategies used in Somalia during UNOSOM II (May 1993 through March 1994.) In both interventions, the U.S. had been successful in its short-term objectives. Just as the U.S. secured famine relief in Somalia, it has largely completed the initial task of removing the brutal governing Taliban regime and destroying the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. However, the long-term efforts of the U.S. to

rebuild Afghanistan within the warlord culture are haunted by the specter of Somalia. A sizeable multinational coalition force today provides for a stable and secure environment only within the capital of Kabul. The interim Afghanistan government continues to be hampered in many areas of the country by the competing interests of regional warlords seeking to retain their autonomy and power. Reflecting on the failure of nation building in Somalia, the Brookings Institute concluded:

The international intervention, in part because it could not or would not face up to the underlying political challenges of political reconciliation in Somalia, ended the operation without introducing a new, sustainable order. The international community paid a high price, but failed to leave behind the foundations upon which the Somalis could govern themselves.¹⁹

The international mission in Afghanistan led by the U.S. is now at an important crossroads. Although the eradication of remaining terrorist base camps remains an important mission in Afghanistan, enduring peace and stability in the region will depend on long-term nation-building efforts by the I.C. The role that the regional warlords will play in this process will be important to the success or failure of this mission.

Warlords and Democratization

The purpose of this study is to determine the appropriate strategy regarding warlords in the democratization process of failed states through international intervention. The question of warlord participation or isolation involves the study of human behavior, cultural characteristics, and societal interaction. The study of warlord behavior resembles in many ways the same study of state behavior. There are similar forces that affect the behavior of both states and warlords. In addition, there is a correlation between the internal security environment (rival clans) and the international

security environment (rival states). The principles of the theories that describe the relations between states are relevant to drafting successful policies involving warlords.

If building democracy in failed states is part of the U.S. strategy to achieve national security, it will be important to effectively deal with warlords. Reflecting on the theoretical bases of behavior for people and states and reflecting on recent experiences, this thesis attempts to help shape U.S. policy towards warlords during democratization within failed states.

Definitions, Assumptions, and Limitations

State

The state is defined by Hans Morgenthau as, “The compulsory organization of society . . . that may employ its monopoly of organized violence [within its borders] for the preservation of order and peace.”²⁰ According to the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the minimum requirements for a state to gain recognition under international law are a defined territory, a population, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into international relations.²¹ All states are respected sovereign entities under international law, which refers to the ability of the state to exercise preeminent control over the people and the policies within its territorial boundaries. To the extent that a state is sovereign, it is free to exercise control over its people without undue interference from external forces such as other states. The concept of sovereignty also applies in the international system of states and confirms the “right” of states to use their instruments of power to defend their existence. The state exercises power through diplomatic, informational, military and economic means and maintains a monopoly on the use of force within its territorial borders.

Nation

A nation represents a group of people that have a shared identity or personal distinctiveness. A particular language, religion, ethnicity, values or principles may all be used to define the national identity of a people. However, nationality is a somewhat amorphous concept that is difficult to clearly define within a state. In W. Phillips Davisson's article on nationality and ethnicity of people, he writes:

Nationality is the most difficult term. Scholars are fond of pointing out the absence of a general agreement of what a nationality is. Indeed as many as 86 different definitions of nationality have been found in literature. This is because it is largely a subjective phenomenon. No outsider can determine whether a particular group of people is a nationality; this can be done only by the people themselves. And since there are many bases for nationalism - including ethnicity, language, religion, a shared cultural heritage or historical memory, and a common social and economic situation - it is possible for new nationalities to appear at any time, or for old nationalities to reappear.²²

Failed State

The descent into anarchy and chaos from a state of normalcy is described by four progressively degenerative phases. Phase one is characterized by the emergence of military, social, and political threats to society. Phase two is characterized by a loss of confidence in the state or states in which the conflict has arisen. Phase three is distinguished by institutional breakdown and the collapse of organizational structures. Phase four represents complete social collapse and lawlessness characterized by constant violence, deprivation, and starvation.²³ In their description of the progressive decay of states by these four phases, Alex Morrison and Dale Anderson describe failed states as those in the final phase of collapse. The final phase is characterized by "complete social collapse, extreme lawlessness, constant and widespread violence, and deprivation and starvation."²⁴

Warlord

John Mackinlay in his article on warlords defines a warlord as, “The leader of an armed band, possibly numbering several thousand fighters, who can hold territory locally and at the same time act financially and politically in the international system.”²⁵ During the fall of authoritarian regimes that governed many post-colonial states, effective control passed into the hands of insurgent leaders from different regions of the country. These leaders or warlords most typically did not coordinate their insurgent campaigns against the state but capitalized on the opportunities provided by one another to assert their own power and influence. Warlords “used a politicized clan system exacerbating differences between them by demagogic propaganda and formed factions based on personal and clan loyalties.”²⁶ Warlords typically emerged from the senior levels of the army leadership and led an all-out campaign to seize resources and power as the state collapsed. Warlords fought not only remnants of the state that remained but constantly warred with one another. Although warlords can control territory and may establish primitive forms of local government, they are not the legitimate governing authority for the society. Their positions of power are de facto and directly tied to their possession of military force used to terrorize and coerce the society.

Democratization

Democratization is the broad, systematic process of replacing, reforming, or creating democratic governments. The process of democratization is separated into the phases of democratic transition and democratic consolidation. Democratic transition is the phase of transforming the cultures and governmental institutions into a democratic model. Democratic consolidation is the lasting measures that help ensure democracy’s

survival. Consolidation is the steady state operation of the democratic government without major reforms. Even under democratic consolidation, the democratic government is constantly changing and evolving to meet the needs and desires of its citizens. Democratization can also involve interventions into failed states by the I.C. to restore law and order under a new democratic government. This process is more commonly called nation building or, more appropriately, state building

Assumptions

This research makes a few important assumptions. The first assumption is that anarchy continues to define the international state system, in that no single power exists to enforce order in the system of states. Despite the U.N. and hegemonic influence of the U.S., nonintervention into the domestic affairs of states remains the normative behavior within the international state system. However, there are certain moral and legal limitations to state sovereignty that may justify intervention. This idea permits certain interventions under international law, such as those into failed states where the chaos and anarchy affect not only the inhabitants but the security of other sovereign states.

The second critical assumption supposes that warlords are rational actors and behave in a similar fashion in response to the forces that affect the relationships between states. Warlords are assumed not to be “crazy” and are capable of reasonable behavior, especially within the framework of their own goals and values. Warlord behavior that appears bizarre or fanatical should be closely studied to better understand the cultural forces and perceptions affecting his interests. The truth is, in many cases, warlords are very well educated. This assumption allows the application of conventional IR theories to understand warlord behavior.

The third assumption involves the ethical foundation for U.S. foreign policy, which is essential to the development of a strategy with warlords. In James Sterba's comments on Stanley Hoffman's book *The Ethics of Intervention*, he identifies three moral approaches to problem solving. These three approaches are Utilitarian, Aristotelian, and Kantian. The problem with the Utilitarian approach, of maximizing the net utility for all participants, is that it allows intentionally evil acts if a greater good would result. This argument is flawed in that the ends do not justify the means, especially when there are no guarantees of the ends. The Kantian approach prescribes actions that all parties would accept under a "veil of ignorance."²⁷ This approach allows for evil acts under the veil of ignorance, if all parties viewed these acts as trivial, easily reparable, or that the consequences would outweigh the evil of the act. However, the impossibility of the I.C. and current U.S. role as the global leader do not afford either of these two approaches. Instead, the Aristotelian approach is preferred, which prescribes actions that "further the 'proper' development of every affected party."²⁸ This approach specifies proper development in terms of the virtuous activity that precludes doing evil even though good may result. Within the reasonable interpretations of the limits placed on the means to an end, this is the approach that U.S. strategy should follow. Our interventions into failed states that involve democratization and military force should promote the ends of peace and stability through "good" means. This does not preclude the use or demonstration of force to accomplish specific objectives of democratization. However, it does preclude using tactics like assassination and torture, and limits unnecessary collateral damage.

The last assumption is that there is a reasonable chance for the success of democratization. Although democratization through international intervention has a poor track record in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia where democracy has not yet consolidated or has outright failed, democratization has proven successful in many other parts of the world. Most notably are the U.S. democratization strategies in Germany and Japan following World War II. Despite the dismal endings of recent nation-building experiences, former Brookings scholar Richard Haass writes:

[It] is at least plausible and perhaps likely that alternatives [to the conduct of the international force] would have met with greater success. . . . The principal alternative would have been to embark from the outset on a policy of concerted peacemaking and nation building.²⁹

Limitations

There are a couple of important limitations to the research to avoid over-expanding the topic of democratization and warlords. The first limitation is the question of the right or entitlement of the U.S. to install a certain form of government that it views is appropriate. Other than the apparent justification found in Thucydides' account of the Melian dialogue³⁰ that "might makes right," this paper does not delve into this argument. The second delimitation is the idea that democracy can be an appropriate form of government for all societies. The research accepts the universal premise of the democratic peace theory so long as the majority of people are enlightened and remain committed to democratic government. The research is also limited in its attempt to explain warlord behavior using IR theories. Lastly, the research does not delve into the tactical decisions by peacekeepers on the ground, but rather addresses the broader

operational and strategic issues with regard to the policy of democratization and warlords.

¹ Geraint Parry and Michael Moran, "Introduction: problems of democracy and democratization," in *Democracy and Democratization*, eds. Geraint Parry and Michael Moran (London: Routledge Publishers, 1994), 6.

² In the Army's manual on Operations, Chapter 9 discusses stability operations and lists the types of support operations as peace operations, foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, and show of force. Chapter 10 discusses support operations and lists these types of operations as domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 2001).

³ Anthony Lake, *From Containment to Enlargement*, Speech by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs delivered to the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington D.C., September 21, 1993; available from <http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1993/usa-930921.html>; Internet; accessed 11 September 2002, 1.

⁴ U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States* (September 2002), 4.

⁵ Gary T. Dempsey and Roger W. Fontaine, *Fool's Errands* (Washington D.C.: CATO Institute, 2001), 22-23.

⁶ Commission on Presidential Debates, *The Second 2000 Gore-Bush Presidential Debate: October 11, 2000*. [transcript online]; available from <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.html>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2003, 1-4.

⁷ U.S. President, Introduction.

⁸ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," in *Theories of War and Peace*, eds. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000), 221.

⁹ W. Phillips Davison and Leon Gordenker, *Resolving Nationality Conflicts: The Role of Public Opinion Research* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹² Library of Congress Website, “Abdur Rahman Khan, ‘The Iron Amir,’ 1880-1901,” Afghanistan-A Country Study [document online]; available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aftoc.html>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2003.

¹³ Afghanistan Information Center, *Political History of Afghanistan* [document online]; available from <http://www.afghan-info.com/Afghistory.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2003, 1.

¹⁴ Countryreports.org, *History of Somalia* [document online]; available from <http://www.countryreports.org/history/somohist.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2003, 1.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, n.d.), 3.

¹⁷ Dempsey and Fontaine, 7.

¹⁸ Email from a former student of Dr. Robert Walz, professor at Department of Joint, Multinational Operations at the Command and General Staff College sent to me 23 September 2002.

¹⁹ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 62.

²⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 487.

²¹ Karin Von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,” *The Washington Quarterly* 23 (winter 2000): 108.

²² Davisson and Gordenker, xiii.

²³ Alex Morrison and Dale Anderson, *Peacekeeping and the Coming Anarchy*, Report No.1 from the Pearson Roundtable Series (Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, Canada: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1996), 3.

²⁴ Morrison and Anderson, 13.

²⁵ John Mackinlay, “Defining Warlords,” in *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, eds. Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 48.

²⁶ John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 13.

²⁷ Stanley Hoffman, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 90.

²⁸ Hoffman, 89.

²⁹ Dempsey and Fontaine, 18.

³⁰ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 400.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to review the current literature relevant to the crafting of policy with warlords in the democratization process. The chapter is broken down into three sections. The first section provides a procedural definition of democracy and the key elements of liberal democratic government. The second section addresses the democratization process. It outlines the preconditions for democratization, the transition process, and the complexities of consolidation. The third section discusses globalization and existing strategies pertaining to interventions in failed states.

The initial section of this chapter gets to the heart of the democratic peace theory by first providing a procedural definition of democracy. As with most political theories of government, there are many different versions and interpretations of democracy. While primitive forms of democracy can be traced back to ancient Greek societies, this research focuses on the development of “modern democracy” as it pertains to nation-states. “Modern democracy is not simply the democracy of the village, the tribe, or the city-state; it is democracy of the nation-state, and its emergence is associated with the development of the nation-state.”¹ The first section then ends with a discussion about liberalism and the distinction between liberal and democratic governments.

The second section discusses the process of democratization and is broken down into three parts. The first addresses the societal preconditions or critical variables that contribute to democracy and democratization. The second discusses democratic transition strategies primarily from the perspective of “transformation” and “replacement.” The third discusses the significant complications of the consolidation of reform in emerging

democratic governments. It categorizes these obstacles to consolidation in terms of transitional, contextual, and systematic problems. It also addresses one transitional problem in particular, the issue of ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict is a dominant element in the causation of many failed post-colonial states and warlord regimes.

The third section covers the effects of globalization on the policy of intervention and discusses some existing strategies for democratization and warlords in failed states. This section highlights the difficulties of “positive ends” intervention strategies, which both Democratic Enlargement and American Internationalism espouse. It then focuses on two different approaches for dealing with warlords during democratization—“Accommodate Existing Structures” and “Encourage New Institutions.” Essentially, Accommodate Existing Structures is an approach to democratization that works with the warlords whereas Encourage New Institutions attempts to remove their influence from the process. Although future policy with warlords is not limited solely to these two strategies, the principles in these two approaches will help shape the examination of the best policy to adopt with warlords in chapter 4.

Democracy and Government

There are many different democratic forms of government around the world today. “Virtually every country in the world proclaims itself to be a democracy,” writes Geraint Perry in his collection of essays on the theory and practice of democracy. Some very authoritarian regimes declare themselves to be a “guided democracy” or “people’s democracy.” Take for instance the constitution of the Chinese People’s Republic which defines its government as the “people’s democratic dictatorship.” But these dictatorships and military regimes fall well outside the normative associations of democratic

government that we have come to accept. To better understand democratization as it applies to the U.S. security strategy it is important to establish a firm grasp of the principles of modern democracy.

The concept of democracy as a form of government goes back to Greek philosophers. Fundamentally, a democracy is a representative form of government anchored in the rule of a society by its citizens. It can be summed up simply in the phrase, “a government of the people, by the people.” This short definition of democracy does not necessarily require the direct participation of all people in a society with every aspect of law and government. Instead, people empower certain individuals and institutions with governmental authority and then hold them accountable through the process of free and fair elections. Joseph Schumpeter writes in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* that, “Even minimal definitions of democracy require periodic elections between candidates who compete fairly for the votes of a substantial portion of the adult population, and whose outcome determines who makes state policy, including foreign and military policy.” Samuel Huntington also makes a strong connection between the electoral process and modern democracy. In his book *The Third Wave*, Huntington identifies two fundamental features of democratic elections--contestation and participation. He uses these two parameters as benchmarks for evaluating different political systems of government and determining which systems are more or less democratic. For example, Huntington classifies governments that harass or censor opposition parties as undemocratic. Likewise, systems that restrict or deny participation in the electoral process to a significant portion of the population are also undemocratic.

Truly democratic elections must be open and competitive, and therefore imply the existence of certain essential civil and political freedoms. These “human rights” include the freedom for individuals to speak, publish, and assemble in order to organize political campaigns and have public debate. These types of freedoms are normally tied to the individual liberties and values associated with the ideology of liberalism. John Owen, the author of “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace” in *Theories of War and Peace*, defines liberalism as the belief that:

Individuals everywhere are fundamentally the same, and are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being. Freedom is required for these pursuits, and peace is required for freedom; coercion and violence are counter-productive. Thus all individuals should want war only as an instrument to bring about peace...[shared] national interests calls for the accommodation of fellow democracies, but sometimes calls for war with other nondemocracies.²

Strict interpretations of liberalism uphold the commanding principle that human rights and individual freedom are universal for all mankind. Human rights are unalienable and apply to all people regardless of cultural or religious idiosyncrasies. Liberalists argue that human rights are not the property of states and that these freedoms or privileges are not to be earned or granted by any government. Liberalists argue that state government should respect and protect individual freedoms, and that governments must not adopt policies that seek to control or repress these freedoms through power and force. Liberalism and its principles take an almost moral approach to human behavior and state government.

However, the adoption of liberalism by a society is not necessarily pursuant of any moral or altruistic agenda. In fact, liberalism is an advancement of individual self-interests; it is more a manifestation of selfishness, than selflessness. However, in order

for the harmonious advancement of every person's freedom, each individual must respect the rights of others. Individuals are allowed to follow their own desires as long as they do not detract from another's freedom; thus the need for cooperation and toleration by learning to respect and accept one another's rights. By gaining this respect and acceptance, individuals abstain from acts of coercion and violence and choose compromise as a means to resolve conflict. "Liberalism's ends are life and property, and its means are liberty and toleration."³ In order for the liberal agenda to manifest itself, Immanuel Kant identifies two crucial requirements for individual freedom within a state. First the citizens must be "enlightened," or, in other words, made aware of their interests and how they should be secured. Second, people must live under enlightened political institutions, which allow the interests of individual liberty to shape politics, not the politics of power wielded by a small, privileged group of elites. It therefore becomes necessary for people within free societies to institute constitutional controls over their rulers in order to prevent tyrannical rule and denial of their individual freedoms.⁴

Democracies that promote the liberal view of universal human rights and the accommodation of individual self-interests are "liberal democracies." Illiberal democracies are popularly controlled governments that use the power of the majority to suppress or marginalize other minority groups--in other words, the tyranny of the majority. This is especially prevalent in societies where factional identities run deep. For example, democratic governments in the Balkans are typically illiberal. This is because societies and politics in this region are often defined in terms of racial and religious identity, not the objective self-interests of an abstract individual. Illiberal democracies can also result from the over-emphasis on other than the liberal values of individual

manifestation. For example, John Owen categorizes ancient Greek democracies as illiberal because “they valued heroism and conquest over self preservation and individual well-being.”⁵

The distinction between liberal and illiberal democracy is important because liberal democracy forms the argument of the democratic peace theory. Using the same line of reasoning that liberals used to justify the need for constitutional controls on domestic government, liberal democracies theoretically pursue a foreign policy of restraint and peaceful overtures. The values of respect and tolerance for individuals found in liberal democracies run counter to the arrogant and aggressive foreign policies associated with authoritarian style governments. Liberal democracies view war as both costly and dangerous, and recognize that war and military force pose a threat to an individual’s freedom of choice. “War is called for only when it would serve a liberal ends--i.e., when it would most likely enhance self-preservation and well-being.”⁶ The adage that “Democracies do not fight other Democracies” refers to this tendency of liberal democracies to avoid war with each other. However, war is justified in cases involving the advancement or protection of human rights and individual freedoms. Therefore, while the norms and culture of liberal democracies prevent them from fighting each other, they are predisposed to fight other nonliberal or nondemocratic states. “No one is quite sure why democracies do not fight one another and yet do fight nondemocracies”⁷ While no one is exactly sure why the democratic peace theory works, it does appear that the peaceful relationship between democratic states is not simply the result of a balance of power arrangement, but has more to do with the norms of liberalism.

While the democratic peace theory works reasonably well to explain the international relationships for liberal democracies, it does not apply to illiberal democracies or liberal authoritarianism. Illiberal democracies have electoral mechanisms for the popular choice of governmental officials, but no constitutional protection of human rights and civil liberties. Illiberal democracies tend to categorize individual interests based on ethnic or religious grounds. As a result, they are often observed abusing the rights of minorities, which leads to domestic instability and inter-group hostility.⁸ Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, view the state as the preeminent force in politics and assume that people within the state live to serve the state. Authoritarian regimes marginalize individual rights in the interests of power and control, and therefore tend to be more aggressive. Even somewhat liberalized authoritarian governments are still focused on accumulating power, and are able to pursue their foreign policy goals unchecked by the desires of the people. In summary, illiberal democracies develop hostile and aggressive policies toward their minorities and do not foster the spirit of compromise and accommodation. Authoritarian government, even with liberal style human rights, is not accountable to the people and aggressively pursues power as a matter of foreign policy. Therefore, in order to realize peace and stability through the democratic peace theory, democratization strategies must not only provide for free and fair elections, but must also embrace liberalism and ensure the protection of human rights for all citizens.

Reflecting on the importance of elections and liberal ideology, the Strategic Assessment in 1999 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) identified these criteria as the basic components for truly effective democratic government:

Public election of officials, through multiparty competition and ballots,
Government decision-making based on a division of powers,
Constitutional protection of individual rights and the rule of law,
Policies that are based on the common good and individual merit.⁹

These broad criteria still afford many different forms of democratic government.

In the U.S. the method of distributing power between the different branches of government is called the “Madisonian” style of democratic government. Other democratic systems include the British parliamentary system. In either case, the systems of government are founded on the same universal, liberal values. Hence, there is flexibility in the mechanics of the U.S. strategy to discover peace and stability through democracy, so long as the principles of the government guarantee democratic and liberal values.

There is also a lot of literature relating democracy to a nation’s economy. However, the broad definition of democracy leaves wide latitude for a country’s economic structure. In the west, liberal democracies are typically coupled with a market economy, but in many countries such as France, considerable state ownership exists. A “market democracy” has the political features of liberal democratic government plus an open economy based on private property, profit seeking, and capitalism. In this regard the market economy echoes the similar themes of individualism that liberal ideology proclaims. Regardless of which type of economic system is in place, a vibrant economy is important to consolidating democracy. Poor economic conditions have historically been an important reason for the rise of authoritarian regimes. In fact, in the INSS assessment, “The real threat to democracy is a lasting global depression, such as the 1930s, when it triggered mass anger and hysteria in many countries.”¹⁰

The issues of a poor economy and the popular rejection of democracy raise an important point. Democracy is a fragile system of government that in some ways seems to go against the selfish nature of man. In his book *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes describes the natural state of man to be chaos and anarchy. Trust and cooperation are tenuous qualities in Hobbes' opinion. In other words, the same freedoms and principles that make liberal democracies strong also tend to make them weak and unstable. Liberal democracies are vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation. Samuel Huntington writes in fact that, "In the twentieth century very few countries created stable democratic systems on their first try."¹ The openness of free speech and political association allow for the misuse of these privileges by radical political parties, religious extremist organizations, and violent ethnic separatist groups. Many new democracies that struggle with political and economic problems brought about by the democratic movement seem to return power to the same authoritarian regimes that had been replaced. The 1999 Strategic Assessment by the INSS said that in some cases people simply believed that, "A strong authoritarian regime was needed to control the region's deep social differences and violent proclivity"¹² and passively succumbed to the authority of the state. This would sometimes lead to a cyclical process of political revolutions between authoritarian and democratic regimes. Huntington described this process in terms of "waves" and "reverse waves" of democratization.

Democratization

Democratization is the process of creating and sustaining state governments based on democratic principles. It involves bringing an end to an authoritarian regime or anarchical situation by establishing basic democratic institutions and procedures and,

finally, consolidating the transitional measures into durable and lasting government. In Samuel Huntington's book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century*, he writes on the movement of authoritarian regimes toward democracy. Although Huntington's discussion on democratization deals with established states, he provides indicators for the successful democratization of failed states. From his research, there appear to be five key elements of democratization: liberalization, cultural variables, steps of democratic transformations and replacements, characteristics of democratic transitions, and democratic consolidation problem areas.

Liberalization

Liberalization is the process of expanding human rights and individual liberties within a society. Liberalization, while an important precursor for democratization, is not in and of itself sufficient to bring about democracy. Even authoritarian regimes can embark on a liberalization process as a means to pacify societal demands for greater civil liberty, but these reforms do not guarantee the continued expansion of the political and economic freedoms necessary for democracy. In fact, it is just as likely that liberalized authoritarian governments will revert back to more repressive measures as it is they will move forward with democratic reforms. The problem for liberalized authoritarian governments is the perspective held by those in government on human rights. Liberal democracies view human rights as unalienable and fundamental for all human beings. Democratic states are then accountable to the people. Any restriction of human rights by the government in a democracy is a very delicate issue, and will only be accepted by the people if it is deemed necessary for good civil order. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes view their citizens as servants of the state who have no rights except those

granted by the state. The reason for liberalization is not altruistic enlightenment, but a grudging recognition by the leadership that it is necessary to accommodate an opposition movement. In any regard, liberal reforms are an important part of any movement towards democratic government.

Cultural Variables

Besides the need for liberalization, Huntington reported a number of cultural variables that existed in societies that underwent democratization in the “third wave” (1973-1990). This list is shown in table 1.¹³ Despite the rather long list of variables, the specific causes of democratization differed substantially from one country to another. He concluded that no single factor was sufficient to explain the development of democracy in any particular country. Rather, the development of democracy in any single country was a combination of these variables, which even varied during different attempts at democracy within the same country.

So how does this apply to failed states? Early interventions by the I.C. in failed or failing states would likely attempt to establish the military, social, political, and economic conditions suitable for democratization. The variables in table 1 act as a guide for nation building projects. Although the variables in table 1 are not absolute criteria, if a significant portion or mix of these variables is not present, it could doom democratization efforts from the start.

Democratic Transition: Transformation and Replacement

Transformations of authoritarian governments occur in five major phases according to Huntington. The first phase is the emergence of democratic reformers. The reasons why certain leaders come forward from within an authoritarian regime to become

advocates of democratic reform varied greatly amongst countries and their interests in reform were not always entirely clear. In some cases the costs of staying in power were overwhelming and a graceful exit from power was desirable or necessary.

Democratization may have offered a way to legitimize a regime if the reformers felt they had the broad support of the public. In other cases, democratization promised benefits for the country. Lastly, there were some idealists who simply felt democracy was the “right” form of government.

Table 1. Cultural Conditions Favorable for Democratization

<u>Category</u>	<u>Cultural Variable</u>
Economic	High overall level of wealth Relatively equal distribution of income or wealth Market economy Economic development and social modernization Instrumental, rather than consummatory culture
Religious	Protestantism
Political	Elite desire to emulate democratic nations Political contestation before mass political participation Democratic authority structures within social groups Political leaders committed to democracy Low levels of political extremism
Social	Strong middle class Strong bourgeoisie Social pluralism and strong intermediate groups Low levels of civil violence High level of literacy and education Traditions of toleration and compromise Traditions of respect for law and individual rights Communal homogeneity and homogeneity
History	Experience as a British colony Feudalism aristocracy at some point in their history Absence of feudalism in the society Occupation and/or influence by a prodemocratic power

In this first phase, there were also liberal reformers who tended to view liberalization as a method of defusing a growing opposition movement without embracing full democratization. Liberal reformers wanted to construct a more secure and stable authoritarianism by a limited expansion of civil liberties without altering the fundamental nature of the administration. Reformers did not want to introduce open, competitive elections that would have risked the loss of power. In either case, the advent of both liberal and democratic reformers created a “first-order force for political change.”¹⁴

The second phase of democratic transformation was the acquisition of power by democratic reformers. Although democratic reformers may have existed within the regime, their rise to power came about usually by one of three mechanisms. The first mechanism was the natural death of a dictator and actions by their successor. The second mechanism involved the normal change in leadership of the authoritarian regime by a democratic reformer. The last mechanism was a physical ouster of the regime and installment of a prodemocratic regime by coup d’etat.

The third phase in the transformation was the trend of liberal reform failing to appease the opposition movement within a country. Although the intent of liberal reformers was not to replace the authoritarian systems outright, the result of liberalization policies that expanded human rights caused a rapid transition toward full democratic reforms. However, these liberal reforms did not always result in a public outcry for democratic government. In fact, if the populace and authoritarian regime believed that the liberalization policies were bringing further volatility, upheaval, and chaos to the state

there was a tendency for the community to readily accept the curtailment of all human rights reforms in favor of public safety and security.

The fourth phase of transformation is what Huntington calls “backward legitimacy” or “subduing the “standpatters.” Standpatters were those members of the ruling regime who resisted democratic transition, either by open disagreement or bureaucratic maneuvering. Huntington explains this prerequisite:

The first requirement for reform leaders was to purge the governmental, military, and where appropriate, party bureaucracies, replacing standpatters in top offices with supporters of reform. This was typically done in selective fashion so as not to provoke a strong reaction and so as to promote fissions within the standpatter ranks.¹⁵

The fifth phase of democratic transformation, which is closely tied to the fourth phase of transition, was co-opting the opposition or achieving “buy in.” The process of negotiation with other political movements, ethnic factions, and major social organizations resulted in formal and informal agreements that helped reinforce the legitimacy of the democratic reforms. This process was important to counteract alienation of the standpatters from the fourth phase, and to defuse controversy and conflict through the advance dialog of sensitive issues.

Democratization may also happen by the course of replacement, which occurs by a different process than that of transformation of an authoritarian regime. Using Huntington’s model, replacement is broken down into three distinct phases: the struggle to produce the fall, the fall, and the struggle after the fall.¹⁶ This option is most often found in dictatorships where the dictators rarely retire voluntarily. The nature of the power exercised by a dictator made the organization of any opposition within the regime a difficult and dangerous proposition. Democratic reforms tended to be weak or missing

from the authoritarian regimes that disappeared by replacement. In order to shift the balance the power from the government to the opposition, reformers sought a broad array of factions opposed to the regime and resorted to a campaign of tearing down the government machine. Although student demonstrations were a common method for spreading dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, replacement strategies were mostly affected through the manipulation of military disaffection, which resulted from the dictator's policy. "Military disaffection was promoted by the dictator's policies of weakening military professionalism, politicizing and corrupting the officer corps, and creating competing paramilitary and security forces."¹⁷

Characteristics of Democratic Transition

Whether by transformation or replacement, the transition of government towards democracy had important common characteristics. Huntington writes that for democratizations in the third wave:

Of the more than twenty-five democratizations that had occurred by or appeared to be underway in 1990, only two, Panama and Grenada, were the result of foreign invasion and imposition. Most of the other transitions were alike in what they lacked. . . . [Democracy was made] by the methods of democracy.¹⁸

The methods of democracy that Huntington writes about can be sorted into three categories. Democratization involved negotiations, elections, and low levels of violence.

Negotiation, compromise, and agreement among the social and political leaders within the country were at the heart of the democratization process. These formal and informal agreements involved the military, government and opposition political parties, business community, labor unions, and religious leaders. Agreement and compromise were usually successful during private and secret meetings amongst rival leaders who had

no vast discrepancy in power resources. The key element of this process was the ability for leaders to deradicalize their position and reach a compromise, which was often a cultural trait. “The willingness and ability of leaders to reach compromises were affected by the prevailing attitudes toward compromise in their society.”¹⁹ The bottom line is that some cultures seem more prone to compromise than others. Using that same logic, there are members of the society who are more willing to compromise than others. In the case of failed states, these might be the elders serving on a tribal or clan council who might be more prone to compromise than a warlord.

Elections were another important characteristic of democratization. “They were [both] the vehicle for democratization and the goal for democratization.”²⁰ Even in many authoritarian regimes, the election was viewed as a method for prolonging and legitimizing the regime’s political power. Rulers of these regimes often supported the elections, not realizing that the results would lead to a loss of power. The question is often asked, “Why did the authoritarian governments sponsor elections that they would likely lose?” First, there was a desire for international respect and legitimacy among the growing global contingent of democratic states in the 1990s. Second was the miscalculation that they either had the popular support or enough control of the electoral process to manipulate the results. Third, the government hoped that opposition parties might boycott the elections fearing retribution from their political base for cooperating with the regime. Whatever the logic, these regimes were usually stunned in overwhelming electoral defeats by the people.

The last characteristic of democratization was the surprisingly low level of violence even during the replacement process. In the third wave “with the possible

exception of Nicaragua, no authoritarian regime was brought down by a prolonged guerilla insurgency or civil war.²¹ There were many reasons for this and they differed among countries. First, the experience of war or significant civil violence in some countries dissuaded further violent transition. The second explanation was that soldiers and police ordered to use force by the rulers of the authoritarian regime were less likely to obey if they could identify with the people they were ordered to shoot. The third reason was the nonviolent methods that most opposition groups used to pursue democracy. However, this does not imply that violence never occurred during democratic transitions. If opposition groups used violence, it was targeted at government officials, staunch collaborators of the regime, or random civilian facilities to discredit the government's ability to provide security for the people. Even nonviolent means sometimes had violent results, as was the case in mass demonstrations. However, opposition groups predominately remained committed to the nonviolent means of removing the authoritarian regime and transition towards democracy.

Problems of Democratic Consolidation

After the initial transition to a democratic government, countries have three types of problems developing and consolidating their new political systems. Huntington categorizes these as the transitional, contextual, and systematic problems to democratic consolidation. Transitional problems are those issues that occur in the mechanics of administering democratic government in a society accustomed to authoritarian style institutions. There are primarily two issues that directly relate to transitional problems. First is how to deal with deposed leaders and, second, how to reduce the military involvement in politics. Contextual problems are issues regarding the nature of the

society. These problems might include ethnic resentment, cultural intolerance, and historical biasness. Systematic problems are those frustrations stemming from the normal workings of a democratic system. Democratic systems are sometimes plagued by periods of stalemate or inaction, the susceptibility to demagoguery resulting from free speech, and the domination by strong economic interests over the societal interests (as might be the case with industrial pollution.) Because the scope of this research focuses on the early stages of democratization involving warlords, the transitional and contextual problems will probably have a greater impact than the systematic problems. Therefore, this paper addresses these two problems in greater detail below.

Transitional Problems

There are two primary issues that encompass transitional problems. The first is the disposition of the former leaders of the authoritarian regime. Because of the nature of power in authoritarian regimes, governments habitually were accused of gross violations of human rights. This led to two courses of action that Huntington calls the options of “prosecute and punish” or “forgive and forget.”²² This issue is important to resolve in order to achieve political reconciliation within the country. There are positive and negative consequences with either option. Arguments for “prosecute and punish” include the sense of moral duty, rule of universal law, deterrence for future violators, and the democratic norm to hold leaders accountable for their actions. On the other hand, forgive and forget recognizes the reality that violations usually occurred on both sides, and that to achieve reconciliation divisions need to be set aside. It attempts to avoid the misconception that what is justice for one group is an act of revenge by another group. Forgive and forget forgoes the priority of immediate justice and favors the more

important interests of consolidation. This is especially the case when ethnic identities are involved with the government. There are strong arguments for each option, but perhaps the best approach is not which is best, but what is the least bad. "Each alternative presents grave problems and the least unsatisfactory course may well be: do not prosecute, do not punish, do not forgive, and above all, do not forget."²³

The second transitional problem is military reform and the need to curb the active participation of senior military leaders in political decisions. Newly elected democratic leaders have to reduce the power and influence of the military to a point compatible with constitutional democracy. This is a serious problem for new democracies, especially in the case of rebellious and powerful militaries that may have played an active role in the transition process. There are five critical areas of military reform that must be addressed. The first is the need to professionalize the military to a nonpolitical role. This will involve a complete revision of the officer corps' education and training. The second is to focus the military on external threats to the security of the nation. Give them a mission that allows them to focus on other than domestic and political concerns. The third and most dangerous area is in the leadership and organization of the military. In a tactful and respectful retirement, democratic leaders must purge all potentially disloyal senior officers, which might include those that helped in the rise to power of the democracy. The new democratic leaders must reestablish civilian control of the military by appointing a civilian minister of defense and simplifying the chain of command. Huntington proposes appointing an admiral as minister of defense as a way to avoid the over-influence of an Army general in politics. Typically navies do not overthrow governments; armies do. Civilian leaders should also, "Praise the soldiers, award medals,

and attend ceremonies,”²⁴ as away to show support for the military. The fourth area is the size and equipment of the army. This calls for significant demobilization and reduction in size of the army, along with an increase in pay from this savings. Huntington also recommends modernizing the army. “Give them toys . . . new equipment makes them happy and keeps them busy trying to operate it.”²⁵ He also suggests aligning this military reform with the military programs sponsored by the U.S. and other democratic nations. It not only helps defray the cost of new equipment and training, but also helps consolidate the military in the democratic principles by establishing a relationship with a strong democratic big brother.

Contextual problems and Ethnic Conflict

Contextual problems are those socio-economic problems that are prevalent in each country. These problems are more persistent than democratic transitional matters and are much more difficult to solve. Citizens placed high hopes in the ability of democracy to resolve many of these problems, but the persistence of these issues generated indifference, frustration, and disillusionment with the new democratic governments.

Politically, the years after the first democratic government came to power were usually characterized by the fragmentation of power of the democratic coalition that had produced the transition . . . growing realization that the advent of democracy would not, in itself, produce solutions to the major economic and social problems.²⁶

Table 2 lists the contextual problems and the countries that struggled with these obstacles during democratization in the 1970s and 1980s. Contextual problems listed in the table are not limited to the countries on the list, and continue to be relevant concerns for many governments today.

One of the most relevant contextual issues pertaining to the study of failed states and democratization is ethnic conflict. The security and survival of an ethnic group, tribe, or clan is one of the principal interests in warlord politics. In addition, ethnic identity is one of the principle methods for espousing loyalty within the warlord's armed bands. Therefore, despite its complex nature, ethnic identity and subsequent ethnic conflict must be addressed. Although this section does not examine ethnic conflict in its entirety, it does provide an explanation for the basis of ethnic identity, reasons for conflict, and the complexities of intervention by the I.C. It first discusses some myths about the nature of ethnic conflict, and then identifies the social forces that perpetuate ethnic divisions. Second, it presents a theoretical basis for understanding the reasons of conflict. Lastly, it presents strategies of ethnic reconciliation and peace building.

Table 2. Contextual Problems during Democratization in the 1970s and 1980s

	Contextual Problems	Examples
1.	Major Insurgencies	El Salvador, Guatemala
2.	Ethnic/ communal conflicts from insurgencies)	India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sudan, Turkey
3.	Extreme poverty	Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
4.	Severe socio-economic inequality	Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Philippines, Peru
5.	Chronic inflation	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru
6.	Substantial external debt	Hungary, Peru, Nicaragua, Poland
7.	Terrorism (apart from insurgency)	Spain, Turkey
8.	State run economies	Argentina, Spain, Mongolia, India

In September 1999, at Perlmutter Lecture on Ethnic Conflict, Chester Crocker identified two myths of ethnic conflict. The first myth was that ethnic conflict is a new problem related to globalization. Crocker argues that ethnic conflict is not a new

phenomenon, but is as old as mankind. Anytime groups of people compete for scarce resources such as food, water, land, or employment there is a natural tendency for conflict. What is new, however, is the breakdown of systems that had previously kept these conflicts under control. “Ethnic conflict has leapt onto the center stage due to the structural changes brought about by the end of the Cold War international system and the European colonial system that predated it.”²⁷

The second myth is the notion that ethnic conflict is so difficult and unmanageable that it is beyond our ability to influence. This myth states that the roots of ethnic tension involve “ancient hatreds, primordial sentiments, and reciprocal vengeance” and are matters that lie within the sovereign domestic arena of the countries involved. Crocker responds to this myth by reasserting America’s moral and strategic responsibility as the world leader to address what are “among the primary threats we face today.”²⁸ In his view, ethnic conflict is manageable through the societal contracts of constitutions, governments, military structures, and other confidence building measures. The problem is not whether or not ethnic conflict can be managed, but rather dealing with what he calls the “spoilers of settlements.” These are individuals or small, radical elements that, even in the face of a negotiated settlement between parties, feel marginalized because of compromises made during negotiations. Whether motivated by needs, race, or greed the minority sabotages the peaceful agreements made by the majority of its people, and perpetuates the myth of eternal conflict.

Apart from the myths, Sean Byrne and Loreleigh Keashly identified the six social forces that bring about ethnic identity to begin with. In their article, “Working with Ethno-political Conflict: A Multimodal Approach,” they write that historical, religious,

demographic, political, economic, and psycho-cultural social forces cause ethnic identity.²⁹ While very clear to the local inhabitants, ethnic identity is often difficult for an outsider to detect, especially when there are no apparent physical differences between two groups living in close proximity to one another. What makes a Somali a Somali? In the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, what leads a person to identify himself as an ethnic Somali as opposed to an Ethiopian? Or in Bosnia Herzegovina, how do you distinguish between a Bosniac, Serb, or Croat? In the case of Bosnia, all people look remarkably similar and speak nearly the same language. However, Serbs write in Cyrillic characters, while Croats and Bosniacs write using the Latin alphabet. There is also a religious separation; most Serbs are orthodox Christians, Croats are predominately Catholic, and Bosniacs tend to follow the Muslim religion. A Bosnian Federation officer attending the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, said that he considered himself a Croat because of his lineage and customs, the fact he and his family were all Catholic, and the basis of his language.³⁰ This subtlety of ethnic identity exists all over the globe. Although it can be as obvious as the racial distinction between blacks and whites, ethnic or national identity is more often found in the very subtle aspects of ancestry and cultural norms.

While there are many different aspects of ethnic identity, it is unclear exactly why there is a tendency for violent conflict to occur between groups of people. The mere fact of ethnic identity is not a harbinger of conflict. It is only when "to be oneself comes at the expense of another that conflict arises."³¹ Ethnic conflict then escalates, in most cases, from rhetoric to violence and eventually leads to irreparable harm to both groups. And in many cases this ethnic violence precipitates future wars and generations became

“prisoners of their history.” In Bosnia for example, “The seeds of the next war between the ethnic groups have already been sown in the brutal civil war from 1991 to 1995.” What’s worse is that some leaders, like warlords and criminal thugs, play up the ethnic strife and enflame average citizens in a selfish grab for more wealth or power.

To better understand these types of cultural clashes, William Zartman provides a variety of theories from his lectures on managing ethnic conflict. The first three theories involve power and security issues; these theories are the “security dilemma theory,” the “power transition theory,” and the “revolutionary theory.” The “security dilemma theory” explains the escalatory spiral of ethnic conflict to result from the perceptions of one ethnic group feeling threatened by another ethnic group. The subsequent measures taken to protect itself drive the other group to institute measures to protect themselves, and, so, the cycle continues, becoming increasingly threatening and hostile. It is the same axiom used in international relations where the reason that states have armies is because other states have armies. The “power transition theory” alleges that ethnic conflict flares up when systems of order breakdown. According to this theory, the breakdown of order and legitimate state institutions is to blame for the conflict. Without the guarantee of law and order, an ethnic group may become hostile in order to deter the exploitation by other ethnic groups. The “revolutionary theory” relates ethnic conflict to a class struggle in which a lower-class group aspires to be on equal grounds as a higher-class ethnic group. This notion is further explained as the “relative deprivation premise” which states that conflict arises when the expectations of “improving groups” are not met, or when their improving conditions experience a downturn.’³²

Zartman's last three theories involve the unequal distribution of resources in a society; these are the "ethnic nepotism theory," "social identity theory," and "developmental theory" of ethnic conflict. The "ethnic nepotism theory" asserts that people will hire members of their own group to promote the group's survival. This favoritism then leads to distributive conflicts and the marginalization of other groups. In the "social identity theory," a previously accepted state of unequal distribution becomes intolerable by a socially subordinate group. This group then rejects its "negative self-image" and works toward a more positive image, thereby creating conflict. The "developmental theory" explains ethnic conflict to be a result of advancing identity groups. It is similar to the "revolutionary theory," however, in this case, it is the current dominant group that feels threatened by socially advancing groups.

Although these theories help explain the basis of ethnic conflict, there is no clear indication of exactly when or why this conflict turns violent. This is important to bear in mind when considering the timing and extent of any third party intervention. Although the general conditions may be impossible to avoid, preventive intervention may help circumvent any human catastrophes resulting from an unhealthy escalation of ethnic conflict. However, fully understanding the conflict and remaining neutral throughout the reconciliation process is usually very difficult.

One reason resolving ethnic conflict is difficult is because people perceive the causes and solutions to ethnic conflict differently. Take for example, the difference between the typical American and European view on solving ethnic problems. To illustrate this distinction, I recall a discussion I had with my former battalion commander just prior to our intervention into Bosnia in 1995. LTC Robert Cox relayed comments to

me of British General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of UNPROFOR (U.N. Protection Force.) At a NATO conference concerning ethnic violence between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs, General Rose said that ethnic conflicts in Europe tend to be territorial conflicts. For example, ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo, a Serbian province, tend to be poor and illiterate. The ethnic Albanians blame their condition on the fact that their province is under the control of the Serbs. If ethnic Albanians owned the land (and in Europe, ethnic groups will usually quote a period of history when they did rule the territory), then they would have a more prosperous life. This conclusion then leads ethnic Albanians to support the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and forming either an independent state or a Greater Albania with surrounding ethnic Albanians. This perception of solving ethnic problems with territorial acquisition is completely different than the way Americans view solutions to ethnic problems. In a similar example, consider ethnic Mexicans living in California who tend to be poor and illiterate. The solution to the problems of the ethnic Mexicans is not seceding from California and rejoining Mexico, but rather in social programs like education and training. In other words, ethnic problems in Europe are territorial problems; ethnic problems in America are social problems.

Because of the interdependence of social and economic factors, solutions to ethnic problems must be multimodal. The solution to one facet of the conflict may have a positive or negative effective on a seemingly independent aspect of the conflict. The conflict is normally interlinked to a host of causes. For instance, humanitarian assistance programs may inadvertently have a negative effect on the economic development of a certain agrarian ethnic group. Religious identities are another example of the very

complicated reconciliation process. Religion can play both a positive and negative role towards peaceful reconciliation. Sometimes religious identities play a negative role stressing divisiveness and “moral rejection of compromise.” And yet other times, religious leaders focus on peace and understanding, encouraging groups to find a nonviolent solution.

Third party interventions should serve as a neutral partner, and work towards peaceful reconciliation by disarming extremist rhetoric, providing truth, and reducing the security dilemma through cooperative security measures. Byrne and Keashly stress the establishment of super-ordinate goals between the warring factions or common goals that all parties want to achieve, but can not without the participation and cooperation of all parties.³³ Crocker acknowledges this type of approach but says that a mediated outcome may never work. He argues that stable outcomes come only from the outright victory of one side over the other or from the negotiated separation of the ethnic groups. In either case, the establishment of a stable and secure environment is the first step towards ethnic reconciliation. This task may very well be the first step in the democratization of a failed state, and would serve as the initial act with or against feuding warlords.

Globalization and Strategies for Nation Building

In the early 1990s the traditional system of states began moving towards a more global international system of states. As the bipolar environment of the communist-capitalist struggle faded into history, modern societies around the world started developing a more global identity. Successful democracies based on free enterprise served as beacons of hope for communist and authoritarian states. Information technologies and developing trade relations began reducing the strict perceptions of

territorial boundaries that separated states. States and free societies began to share common interests and attitudes towards responsible international behavior.

“Globalization” was very positive for the U.S. as indicated in a 1998 National Defense University strategic assessment, which called this, “an era of hope and promise.”³⁴ It forecasted an expanding community of responsible democracies, bound together by the free flow of goods, resources, and knowledge, and predicted a bleak future for oppressive rogue regimes.³⁵ John Gaddis writes that many assumed that the expansion of the global economy would overcome religious and ethnic nationalism in an age of tolerance and interdependence.³⁶

Since the fall of communism the forces of globalization have had an interesting effect on the I.C. These forces appear to be fostering a juxtaposition of two extremes. On the one hand, globalization is creating a stable international environment through the interdependence of states bound together by the interests of peace, cooperation, and economic prosperity. On the other hand, globalization also appears to be producing greater instability and division within states, yielding a “more dangerous and unpredictable world characterized by shifting power relationships, ad hoc security arrangements, and an ever widening gap between haves and have-nots.”³⁷

To address the dangers of oppressive isolated regimes and internal state conflicts resulting from globalization, many advocated a new approach to national security. One strategy that surfaced was the prointervention strategy of “positive ends,” which broadly encompasses the ideas of Democratic Enlargement and American Internationalism. It argues against the short-range strategies of neo-isolationism and preventative defense. The authors of the “positive ends” strategy promote the idea of enlarging the circle of

democratic stakeholders through proactive interventions, but point out two significant concerns when interventions involve military force. First, “positive ends” is a much more resource intensive strategy in the short term than those of containment or isolation. Second, “positive ends” carries the danger that state and nonstate actors might misconstrue the strategic objectives in interventions to be a form of “Pan Americanism” particularly if American leadership appears aggressive and hegemonic. This second weakness has a profound effect with regard to the states of former colonial powers where there seems to be an extremely strong desire to demonstrate self-reliance. Despite the best intentions of the U.S., American forces intervening in these failed states run the risk of being characterized by the political powers within the country, such as warlords, as conquerors as opposed to liberators.³⁸

There are many specific variables that affect an interventionist strategy, but primarily it becomes an issue of resources, time, and risk. Karin von Hippel writes in her article “Democracy by Force” that the decision to intervene is usually based on an assessment of the country’s size, relative power, U.S. national interests in the region, and likelihood of a successful outcome. Apart from these strategic concerns regarding intervention, she also comments on the “Do Something” dilemma, which relates to the ability of western media to influence the decisions of political leaders. There are many instances when the scale of human suffering portrayed by the media inspired policy makers to intervene in the internal affairs of failing states.

While there are many ways to intervene in the affairs of a failed or failing state, there are problems with the unintended consequences of some of these actions. Take economic sanctions, for example, used to influence errant leaders. Economic sanctions

normally endure for a long time, affect the common people, not the leaders, and instead of resolving crises, simply further contribute to the collapse of what remains of the state. Diplomatic efforts tied to economic incentives are also typically ineffective and plagued by noncompliance. Humanitarian relief, in the case of Somalia, did nothing to end the chaos of warlord violence. In fact, humanitarian assistance became a source of power for Somali warlords. “This noncompliance eventually compelled the U.S. government to choose force in order to demonstrate that the [initiatives of the] sole remaining superpower would not be pushed around [or manipulated] by nasty, tin-pot, small-time, thugs, dictators and warlords.”³⁹

Failed State Interventions

Failed states are profound on many levels, not the least of which is the destruction of the normative principles and political culture necessary for a functioning society. Society degenerates to an anarchical state described by Thomas Hobbes as “the natural state of man.” Just like the laws of physics, societies tend to fall to their lowest potential. In other words, structured societies do not naturally gravitate toward some form of utopia, but rather toward anarchy, self-interest, and individual survival. Inhabitants in failed states learn to endure in the chaotic conditions of anarchy by abandoning the old cultural precepts of constraint and societal order. Armed gangs and clan identity replace families and normal forms of human identity. Internecine clan violence organized by regional warlords becomes a way of life for most people. “The old system of beliefs and codes of behavior suited another universe, not the strange and frightening world of living in the rubble of modern state collapse.”⁴⁰ In Bosnia, blurred ethnic identities through cross-marriages and generational peace did not prevent the resurgence of ethnic

nationalism and societal disorder. One man said, “I never ever thought of myself as a Muslim or ethnic Bosniac until the war.” Before any attempt at democratization, interventions must first restore societal law and order within a stable and secure environment.

In a recent Brookings report on failed states, Jeffery Lyons and Ahmed Samatar observe the apparent capability of culture to regenerate and reinvigorate itself given the right environment. They list five groups of actors that have the greatest effect on returning society back to the normative values of moral constraint and collective accommodation. The first group is the elders or senior traditional leaders of a society. These leaders are normally marginalized and threatened by the reigning warlords because of the elders’ criticism of clanistic violence and social injustice. The second group is the moderate religious leaders that advocate peace and reconciliation. The third group is the “modernizers,” which include intellectuals, professionals, and middle class businessmen. “Secularity and practical talent keep tradition and faith from becoming either anachronistic or blindly zealous.”⁴¹ The fourth group is the collection of oracles and poets, especially true for more primitive societies. The fifth group is women, whose role in cultural restoration is also stressed by Von Hippel. “The inclusion of women should also be emphasized as their role is often enhanced during civil conflicts because traditional, male dominated structures break down.”⁴² Lyons and Samatar recognize that women more than other element in society have the “burning [desire] for security, democratic life, material well-being, respect, and equality.”⁴³

Although warlords have a significant amount of political power and social clout from their control over their clan militias, they will probably experience difficulty serving

as one of the legitimate social officials to help restore the genuine cultural values for two reasons. First, leaders in this endeavor must be able to establish a productive dialogue with all of the warring factions. As a result of a warlord's previous actions, it is reasonable to expect some parties to be strongly opposed to the warlord's presence in the negotiations. Second, warlords are generally only interested in wielding political authority for their own interests, not the collective interests of the society as a whole. Nevertheless, warlords will insist that they are legitimate political entities and demand that they approve any settlements within their regions of control. However, the political authority and cultural leadership must not be based on guns and looted resources but the unprompted respect from the general populace.

There are some warlords who may legitimately represent important constituencies and, therefore, their inclusion in the democratization process may help promote a nonviolent transition. However, most warlords thrive only in the lawlessness of a failed state, and they must be prevented from destroying the new order through subversive tactics. Assuming that warlords are the centers of power in a failed state, it is absolutely critical that an intervention strategy identify effective control measures for dealing with these individuals. Lyons and Samatar developed two models for political reconstruction that perhaps best answer the question of how best to go about nation building with warlords. Most strategic thinking on nation building can be broken down into these two distinctive models, which Lyons and Samatar call "Accommodate Existing Structures" and "Encourage New Institutions."

Accommodate Existing Structures

This strategy is based on the explicit or implicit judgment that the forces that survived or developed after state collapse represent the principal source of legitimate authority and should be the core of the new, sustainable order. Militias or clan organizations represent the principal mechanisms to organize society as a result of the destruction of all other societal organizations such as labor unions, political parties, and other professional groups.

If the military leaders [i.e. warlords] are supported by a broad constituency [that is] attracted by the ability of their organizations to provide assistance and protection, and the militias have the ability to transform themselves into political organizations capable of maintaining that support under peaceful conditions, then they may serve as the basis for a new order. Besides their position as the major institutions that exist following state collapse, the militias have the ability to disrupt any agreement that they do not support.⁴⁴

The Accommodate Existing Structures strategy is in many ways similar to Samuel Huntington's transformation model of democratic transition discussed earlier. Ideally, if the surviving forces are capable of acting as the basis for a new, democratic order, interventions should be shorter, involve less risk, and fewer resources.

There are many operational implications for interventions using this strategy. Multinational forces would establish a neutral posture and permissively enter into the country with the consent of the warring factions. Forces would help facilitate an end to hostilities among the warring factions by negotiating a multilateral cease-fire. Forced disarmament would be avoided, with peace instead arranged through a balance of power so that no one group or warlord could dominate. Supervision of an arms control agreement would be possible, but only on the clear agreement and cooperation of all factions. Intervening forces would take a neutral approach to any single faction and

attempt to avoid armed conflict resulting from confrontations with any of the warring factions.

Intervention by the I.C. would follow U.N. Chapter VI doctrine and accept the warlords as legitimate political leaders. It would not attempt to drastically alter the makeup of these organizations, but would require certain reforms tied to economic incentives. The goal of political reconciliation necessary for democratization would be sought in broad political agreements and compromises amongst the militias. To achieve wide support of the agreement by the warlords, accountability of past behavior and human rights abuses that occurred during the conflict would not be emphasized. Settlements would be crafted to convince those with arms that cooperation rather than resistance best serves their interests. The benefits of cooperation must outweigh the perceived benefits of noncompliance with the I.C. initiatives. This sort of approach to nation building was exactly the philosophy used by Robert Oakley and LTG Johnston during the UNITAF operation in Somalia prior to the handoff to the UNOSOM II forces in May 1993.

Encourage New Institutions

This model concludes that the forces and organizations following state collapse cannot serve a new sustainable order. Just as Accommodate Existing Structures replicated Huntington's transformation model, the Encourage New Institutions model resembles the replacement democratization strategy. Warlords in this model are deemed not to have an interest in peaceful reconciliation and democratization. Their leadership and position of power must be replaced with democratic reformers using force sanctioned by the I.C.

In this model, warlords and their followers seize power by the illegitimate use of force rather than by a political process endorsed by the local populace. Warlords and their militias use their power to loot, pillage, and plunder the state's resources to further their desires for power. The I.C. identifies warlords as the major source of instability and sees no hope in building a new political order around these figures. The warlord militia forces thrive in this anarchical environment and subvert any attempts to transition to peace and reconciliation. Interestingly, the warlord's ability to wield force doesn't necessarily imply unyielding support from his followers. Many warlords actually require anarchy and civil war to unite and pacify their supporters. "Only so long as he can lead looters to the next village for booty can he count on their [his followers] support. The moment he is deprived of the power to raid, his opportunistic followers are likely to desert him."⁴⁵

Under this scenario, the I.C. and its multinational forces establish a security umbrella that would allow new institutions to develop. This security umbrella would allow nascent political leaders that were previously threatened to come forward to build institutions and establish the political authority capable of democratic leadership. A warlord would be allowed to voluntarily leave his militia position in order to compete in the legitimate political process as a civilian but with certain restrictions on his ties to the clan's armed forces. To prevent a warlord from playing a spoiler's role, the I.C. requires a sizeable intervention force, robust rules of engagement, and resilient political will to isolate anyone attempting to derail the peace process. A large fighting force would be necessary to neutralize the warlord's fighting forces from affecting the arbitration process. This does not necessarily require open combat against the warlord's forces. Size and capabilities alone may be enough to deter a warlord. Despite their recommendation

for a large, robust intervention force, Lyons and Samatar caution against using armed force directly against a warlord to soundly defeat his forces unless absolutely necessary.

While complete disarmament is probably an impossible goal, arms control is nonetheless an important aspect of this strategy. The monopoly on the use of force must be taken away from the warlords and returned to the democratic state. Complete disarmament is difficult because many individuals will still fear the threat of the anarchical environment during transition. They will hide personal weapons deemed necessary for their own survival and protection of their property from bandits. However, arms control of heavy weapons and the overall reduction of arms are within the realm of the intervening force. This model recommends arms control by seizing unregistered weapons, regulating where and when weapons may be possessed, and forcing the encampment or destruction of heavy weapons. “Because total disarmament is not feasible, the key aim of the international forces and a future interim administration must be to create a political and economic climate in which buried [or hidden] guns stay buried.”⁴⁶

In a separate discussion on another model similar to Encourage New Institutions, David Rieff argues for the establishment of international protectorates upon failed states, such as Afghanistan and Somalia. The international protectorate may be designated or sanctioned by the U.N., but the protectorate, not the U.N., would handle the business of democratization. The protectorate would not only effectively control humanitarian relief workers and international civil servants, but also massive numbers of Western troops. In his editorial to the *Wall Street Journal*, Rieff says successful democratizations of failed states are simply too important in this era to rely solely on U.N. led nation building

efforts. He bases his conclusion on past attempts by the U.N. and its tendency to act “as both a fig leaf for the great powers and a welfare agency for failed states.” Rieff argues that the U.N. relies too heavily on the capabilities of humanitarian and developmental aid to both reconcile the interests of the warring factions and influence the people to adopt democracy. Rieff approaches the democratization issue in a much different fashion than many within the U.N. who confine democratic transitions within the cultural constraints existing within the failed state. In his opinion, this dooms the democratization process from the very start because the interests of the warlords leading the factions are not democracy and liberalism, but power and greed. As an example, democratization in Afghanistan is doomed using the “loya jirga,” a gathering of tribal and religious leaders, because it is their interests and leadership that ushered in the current state of ruin and horror to begin with.

Indeed, the only regime that would at least offer a possibility that the future of Afghanistan would be better than its hideous recent past would be for an international [Western] protectorate in which the warlords had little or no say. For the process of democratization is going to take decades, and, politically incorrect though it may be to insist that this is a job only the West can do, it cannot be entrusted to people who wouldn't know a human right is they tripped over it. No amount of UN window dressing, high-flown rhetoric, and humanitarian aid can change this fact.⁴⁷

Other Strategic Issues Regarding Nation Building

Rieff's comments touch on a few general issues not exclusive to either strategy of Accommodate Existing Structures or Encourage New Institutions but, nonetheless, important to nation building. The first issue involves the size and composition of the intervention force. He argues that the process would require massive Western troops to adequately protect liberal democratic reforms from warlord antics. This point is echoed in

Michael Massing's article where he comments on the size of the force in Bosnia compared to that in Afghanistan.

In contrast to Bosnia, where 60,000 peacekeepers were initially stationed, only 3,500 have been sent to Afghanistan, a country 12 times as large. Just this week, the Central Intelligence Agency itself warned in a classified report that Afghanistan could again plunge into chaos if steps were not taken to restrain and disarm rival warlords.⁴⁸

Even in the case of Accommodate Existing Structures, the size of the force must be large enough to be a credible deterrent and accomplish its mission essential tasks.

The second is the length of time required for democratization to take hold in failed states. Rieff writes about democratization in terms of decades not years. Robert Dorff writes in his article on the ungovernability of failed states, that a broader strategy is needed with respect to the process of building democratic states. It first requires effective government and then effective democracy. His research suggests that this "can only be done over the long term, focusing on developing civil society, attitudes, and norms of behavior, not just institutions and elections."⁴⁹ Limiting the scope of the problem to a single issue or crisis is a sign of the inability or undesirability to address the true nature of the conflict. The operation in Somalia he writes was not a problem of "mission creep" but a failure to address the true causes of the conflict or tragedy.

The operation [in Somalia] failed first and foremost because of a faulty understanding of the conflict. The humanitarian crisis . . . was a result of the failed state and ungovernability; the state was not failing because of the humanitarian crisis.⁵⁰

Supporting this aspect of time, Michael Massing questions whether democracy can come too soon in failed states. The process of developing political parties and educating people to the degree of enlightenment that Huntington felt would be necessary

for democracy simply takes a long time. Western countries' impatience to quickly consolidate democracy sometimes causes them to push an errant timetable and ill-advised prioritization of tasks. Thomas Carothers, the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says, "There is a democratic template that, once put in place, requires you to focus on things which really aren't essential. Elections, for instance, require a huge amount of work."⁵¹ According to Susan Woodward, early elections strengthen people who are armed, like warlords, because they can use their weapons to confront opponents, and intimidate voters.⁵² As an example, Massing looked at Russian democracy and said that what Russia really needed was not elections and political parties but stronger bureaucracy and enhanced regulatory agencies, all things that were distasteful following the end of the authoritarian regime.

The timing for elections is not without debate and it is closely tied to the issue of the policy taken towards the warlords. Marina Ottaway, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, argues that the rush to embrace a democratic reconstruction model for Afghanistan is dangerous and creates unrealistic expectations. She said that well-intentioned plans for early elections ignore the strength of the warlords on the inhabitants. She advocates working with the warlords to distribute humanitarian aid where the central government is weak. Paula Moore, special advisor to the U.N. foundation, disagrees saying, "The outside world cannot tolerate corruption, concessions to warlords, or sacrifice any Afghan aspirations for democracy."⁵³ In her opinion, the warlords have extremely limited support from the populace and rely heavily on humanitarian aid. The warlord interests are not in democracy or strengthening the central government but maintaining enough chaos to continue the foreign aid. Both agree on the

prioritization of security and basic “law and order” before any attempt at national elections. In any event, the strategic question about where these warlords fit in the process of democratization is a major issue. An effective strategy must be both realistic in its aims and consistently applied in a coordinated effort by all members of the I.C. involved in the process of democratic nation building.

¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 13.

² John Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” in *Theories of War and Peace*, eds. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000), 143-144.

³ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans by J.M.D. Meiklejohn (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1990), 41-48.

⁵ Owen, 148.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 145.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 138.

⁸ Institute for National Strategic Studies, *1999 Strategic Assessment: Chapter Twelve: The Democratic Core: How Large, How Effective?* The National Defense University [study online]; available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa99/sa99cont.html>; Internet; accessed 19 October 2002; 190.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 198.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 197.

¹¹ Huntington, 270.

¹² INSS, *1999 Strategic Assessment*, 198.

¹³ Huntington, 37.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 138.

¹⁶ Ibid., 142-143.

¹⁷ Ibid., 145.

¹⁸ Ibid., 164.

¹⁹ Ibid., 171.

²⁰ Ibid., 174.

²¹ Ibid., 164.

²² Ibid., 211.

²³ Ibid., 231.

²⁴ Ibid., 253

²⁵ Ibid., 252.

²⁶ Ibid., 255.

²⁷ Chester A. Crocker, "How to Think About Ethnic Conflict" Perlmutter Lecture on Ethnic Conflict, vol. 7, no. 10, September 1999 Foreign Policy Research Institute webpage [essay online]; available from <http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0710.199909.crocker.howtothinkaboutethnicconflict.html>; Internet; accessed 29 April 2003; 2.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Sean Byrne and Loreleigh Keashly, "Working with Ethno-political Conflict: A Multimodal Approach," in *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, eds. Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 103.

³⁰ Slaven Blavicki, Major in the Bosnian Federation Army, interview by author, 25 February 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Bell Hall, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

³¹ I. William Zartman, *Managing Ethnic Conflict*, Perlmutter Lecture on Ethnic Conflict, vol. 6, no. 5, September 1998 Foreign Policy Research Institute webpage [essay online]; available from <http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0605.199809.zartman.managingethnicconflict.html>; Internet; accessed 29 April 2003; 1.

³² Ibid., 2.

³³ Sean Byrne and Loreleigh Keashly, 103.

³⁴ Institute for National Strategic Studies, *1998 Strategic Assessment: Chapter One The Global Environment*, The National Defense University [study online]; available

from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa98/sa98ch1.html>; Internet; accessed 19 October 2002.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *Muddling Through? A Strategic Checklist for the United States in the Post-Cold War World*, Naval War College [article online]; available from <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/csf/gaddis.html>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2003; 5.

³⁷ Huba Wass De Czege and Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends*, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, September 2001; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/positive/positive.pdf>; Internet; accessed 29 April 2003; vii.

³⁸ Ibid., ix.

³⁹ Von Hippel, 99.

⁴⁰ Lyons and Samatar, 64.

⁴¹ Ibid., 66.

⁴² Von Hippel, 107.

⁴³ Lyons and Samatar, 66.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 71.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 73.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 75.

⁴⁷ David Rieff, "Bonn Fire of the Vanities," *Opinion Journal* from The Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, 2 Dec 2001; available <http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=95001544>; Internet; accessed 6 March 2003; 3.

⁴⁸ Michael Massing, "In Failed States Can Democracy Come Too Soon?" *New York Times*; available from <http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/transcrime/articles/In%20Failed%20States%2C%20Can%20Democracy%20Come%20Too%20Soon.htm>; Internet; accessed on 23 Feb 2002; 2.

⁴⁹ Robert H. Dorf, "Democratization and Failed States," *Parameters*, Summer 1996, pages 17-31; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96summer/dorff.htm>; Internet; 30 April 2003; 23.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Massing, 1.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 2.

CHAPTER 3

THEORIES OF BEHAVIOR

This chapter continues to build on the concept of transforming failed states run by warlords into liberal democracies. Chapter 1 of this paper introduces the NSS objectives and the principles of the democratic peace theory. The NSS asserts that failed states can no longer be ignored or “contained” and represent more than just a humanitarian interest. As a result of globalization, there are new threats spurred by the expansion of information accessibility and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that empower rogue states and nonstate actors with the capability to directly affect the national security of the U.S. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, President Bush placed a new emphasis on nation building and democratization. The magnitude of these terrorist attacks changed the acceptability of these missions with both the national leadership and the American society.

Chapter 2 of this paper outlined the steps necessary to consolidate liberal democratic government, which is the only form of government capable of fulfilling the promises of democratic peace. The second chapter described the characteristics of democratic transitions and the complexities of consolidation. The chapter then wrapped up by presenting the strategies of Accommodate Existing Structures and Encourage New Institutions, as well as discussing various challenges regarding warlords and their impact on new democracies.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the philosophical groundwork for U.S. policy involving warlords as it applies to the strategy of democratizing failed states. If warlords are indeed the center of power in failed states, how will the forces of

democratization and nation building affect their behavior? The chapter divides the answer to this question into three sections. The first section describes the three different perspectives of war and conflict using Kenneth Waltz's model from *Man, the State, and War*. The second section considers warlord behavior from a human behavioral perspective using Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Hobbes' philosophy of man's state of nature. The last section approaches warlords from a realist perspective and focuses on their interests. Although realism is normally associated with IR, the concepts that form the theory are appropriate to help explain a warlord's response to the stimulus of a democratization policy.

Perceptions of War and Human Conflict

There are many different perspectives regarding the causes of international war and human conflict. In his 1959 book *Man, the State, and War*, Kenneth Waltz identifies three different approaches to study the phenomena of war, which he calls the "images of international relations." According to Waltz, the three images of war are the individual, the nation-state, and the international system. Waltz investigates whether the causality of international war is primarily a function of individuals, nation-states, or the international system of nation-states. Despite this thesis' focus on warlords and the conditions within states, Waltz's framework still applies to any study of violence that erupts between different groups of people. Is the warlord violence in failed states a function of the individual, a characteristic of certain clans, or the result of the actions by other state actors? In fact the answer may be all the above, but it is important to decide from which perspective to approach the problem before establishing a democratization strategy.

Individual System

The individual system of analysis cites specific people as the primary grounds for all wars and conflicts by arguing that decision-making ultimately rests in the hands of individual leaders. The disposition of an individual to decide on critical issues for the state involves both a historical element as well as a philosophical nature. In historical terms, the character of a specific individual who just happens to be in a key position of power during a critical period is the most important link to the reasons behind state behavior. In philosophical terms, specific individuals are less important than the instinctual nature of human motivation reacting to stimuli in the environment. While both perspectives are important, the difference between the two is that the philosophical perspective is a more universal approach to behavior that focuses on stimuli and environment, not on the specific personalities and experiential development of one individual. Therefore, the philosophical approach appears to be better suited to broadly characterize warlord behavior than the historical approach of focusing on one particular warlord.

There are two key distinctions among the different philosophical theories that describe human nature. The first is whether man is inherently good or inherently bad. Is man prone to pursue peace or violence in his natural state? Idealists like Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau argue that man is inherently good, peace loving and selfless. It is not the individual himself but the collective body of individuals known as society that is to blame for corrupting man's inner soul. Realists, on the other hand, consider the basic nature of man to be aggressive and prone to violence. Thomas Hobbes wrote in 1651 that the natural state of man is a one of perpetual war of all against all, where no morality

exists, and everyone lives in constant fear. Others, like Saint Augustine and Benedict Spinoza, stress not the absolute nature of man to be good or bad but the importance of self-preservation in human behavior. Spinoza asserted, “By sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his disposition, avenges the wrongs done to him, and endeavors to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates.”¹

The second distinction between philosophies is whether man’s nature can be changed. Liberalists believe that enlightenment, benevolence, and education programs can improve the condition of the common man (or woman). Conservatives feel central government (the political incarnation of the liberal elite) can do little to change the nature of man or the elemental “unfairness” of life. In fact, conservatives consider these programs ineffective attempts at social engineering that cost a good deal of money and often leaves the “beneficiaries” worse off than before.

The heavy influence of warlords in failed states on the local populace clearly supports this level of analysis. The question essentially becomes which philosophical approach to adopt. Although there is an abundance of philosophical explanations pertaining to the general nature of human behavior, the concepts of Abraham Maslow and Thomas Hobbes are the philosophical approaches primarily used in this research to characterize warlords. The second section of this chapter covers the subjects of human motivation and the nature of man according to Maslow and Hobbes in much greater detail.

Nation-State Level

The second level of analysis is the nation-state level. This level of analysis focuses on the internal structure of states and how this structure causes states to behave in certain, predictable ways. This approach asserts that sovereign states are the primary actors in international relations. As a result of their sovereignty, states act relatively independently and may behave very differently to similar situations. Waltz emphasizes the nature of a state's political system as one of the major determinants of state behavior. For example, this approach asserts that democracies respond differently than authoritarian governments to the same forces. This claim gives rise to the democratic peace theory introduced earlier, which stated that democracies do not go to war with other democracies. More specifically, liberal democratic states do not feel threatened by other liberal democratic states. The nation-state level of analysis asserts that societies, and governments in particular, are organized into groups of individuals with different objectives, interests, and intentions. Therefore, it is less important to understand the leader or leaders of a state than it is to understand the state's organizations and strategic goals.

International System

The last level of analysis is the international system. This approach examines state behavior from the perspective of how it functions in the international organization of states. The concept associated with this level is that the international system exerts forces on states that compel them to act in certain, predictable ways. These forces influence a state's reaction regardless of an individual leader or form of government. In other words, states in a unipolar or hegemonic environment will react differently to the same forces

resulting from a bipolar or multipolar environment. One of the common theories using this level of analysis is the balance of power theory. If a single state attempts to dominate a particular region in a certain area, other states will join together to counter this influence. This level of analysis still follows the premise that the international system is an anarchical system, without any legitimate global authority to compel states to behave in any certain fashion. States will act in a way that best ensures their survival based on the international forces around.

One paradigm of the international system analysis is the apparent support of warlordism by some states. According to this approach, international anarchy forces states to react in certain ways that are independent of their leadership or governmental structure. Due to the chaos and anarchy of a failed state, it would not seem to serve the interests of another state, especially a bordering state, to promote this environment. Failed states would seem to threaten these states by harboring bandits and terrorist groups, and by supporting illegal trade networks. However, despite this presumption, the domestic instability of a failed state may at times best serve the security interests of these states in two ways. First, it may act as a valuable buffer between competitive states in a region. Second, the disorder in a failed state precludes an organized incursion to reassert old territorial disputes.

The case of Somalia is a good example of this situation. As a result of the dispute over the Ogaden region described in chapter 1 of this paper, Ethiopia supported Somali warlords with weapons, money, and training necessary to perpetuate the civil conflagration within the Somali borders. The loyalty to any specific faction was tenuous and only large enough to ensure that none of the Somali warlords ever became capable of

consolidating the state through force. Ethiopia feared that a reunited Somali state would once again threaten its borders, and chose instead to support Somali warlordism as the lesser of two evils. Applying Waltz's third image analysis, the Ethiopian support to the civil war in Somalia was not a function of an Ethiopian leader or its form of government. Rather, it was a rational decision that came as a consequence of Ethiopia's need for security in the anarchical system of states in the region.

Waltz's three images of war each give a unique perspective on the causes of violent conflict between people. The first image focused on the individual leaders involved in pursuing the conflict. The second image concentrated on the specific culture of the organization that encourages violent behavior. And the third image considered the impact of the external environment. When analyzing failed states and an effective intervention strategy, warlords are at the heart of the issue. Within the context of a failed state, a warlord's interests are described in terms of satisfying his basic needs, man's state of nature, and the realist concept of power.

Human Behavior

There are many philosophies of human behavior and motivation that apply Waltz's first image approach to war and conflict. The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical base to evaluate warlord behavior from a perspective that best fits the failed state environment. Human behavior is extremely difficult to model because of its complex makeup involving both passion and logic. While this section can in no way completely cover all aspects of behavior, it frames warlord behavior two ways. First, it uses Maslow's hierarchy of needs to present a model for human motivation that seeks to gratify one's essential needs. Second, this section describes the state of nature according

to Thomas Hobbes, which leads to social contracts and states. It describes the problems for societal development that warlords cause in the Hobbesian state of nature. The goal of this section is to introduce the fundamentals that will be used later in chapter 4 to recommend policies with warlords that have the best chance of leading toward democratic government.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and Human Motivation

Maslow's theory of needs states that there are five basic needs of all men: physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization. As one need becomes satisfied, another takes over. It was a revolutionary concept, but not because it was a new approach or theory. It was ground breaking for two reasons. First, Maslow synthesized the ideas of many leading psychological theories and, second, he established that higher needs were as instinctual as lower needs. In a pragmatic way, Maslow showed how these needs influence man's subconscious and his behavior. "Man is a wanting animal and rarely reaches a state of complete satisfaction except for a short time. As one desire [or need] is satisfied, another pops up to take its place."²

In his theory, Maslow claimed that basic needs were prioritized in a general manner that described which needs most affected human behavior at any specific time. Maslow ordered the basic needs in a general hierarchical fashion with certain types of needs outweighing other needs. However, there were three special issues concerning his theory. First, the means to satisfy any one of these basic needs were not necessarily exclusive to any one particular need. Second, Maslow allowed for the holistic aspect of basic needs. Third, he accounted for personality and the relative effects of one's environment. These issues make it difficult to develop a mathematical equation for all

human beings. However, these issues aside, the gratification of basic needs is largely a universal concept, which energizes the individual will to act or behave in a certain manner. The basic needs are shown in their hierarchical fashion below in figure 1.




Figure 1 Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Physiological Needs

Maslow's motivation theory starts with the physiological needs. Physiological needs equate to the basic need for food and water; the liquids, carbohydrates, proteins, and essential vitamins and minerals that are necessary for survival. This need is the most powerful of all basic needs stemming from homeostasis (the bodies attempt to maintain a normal state of the blood stream.) It is also very pervasive in that the failure to meet

another need, such as love, safety, or esteem (all which will be discussed shortly), may motivate someone to hunger for food.

If all basic needs are completely unsatisfied, the physiological need consumes the entire reality of an individual. “For our chronically hungry man, Utopia can be defined as a place where there is plenty of food.”³ A man who is so encapsulated by his hunger is incapable of realizing that the satisfaction of his need for food will not lead him to a state of permanent bliss. However, once this need is satisfied, the other basic needs quickly become apparent.

Despotic leaders, including failed state warlords and other third world dictators, who have the capability to effect this basic need, may attempt a strategy of manipulating this basic human requirement in order to control the populace. This strategy was evidenced in Somalia where warlords primarily controlled the distribution of international food aid shipments. It is also apparent in the domestic policies of rogue states like Sudan and North Korea as well. The deprivation of food keeps the local populace focused on their survival and not on their higher order needs. The warlord or other despotic leader distributes just enough aid to keep his subjects focused on their physiological needs, but withholds enough food, water, and medicine to fully satisfy these needs, which might then trigger demands for political freedom and reform.

Safety Needs

Once the physiological needs are satisfied, safety needs emerge. Safety needs are those desires for the protection or security from pain, fear, violence, and death. The instinctual aspect of human self-protection and survival characterizes safety needs. Humans manifest this need by creating regular routines that provide a sense of a

predictable, orderly world. Maslow describes the safety needs as the desire for “security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector; and so on.” He explains that the preference for a consistent routine by a child is an early indication of this basic need. He points to the fear that a turbulent schedule causes in a child when this need is in jeopardy. Although mature adults handle their fears better than children, these needs persist into adulthood, and are satisfied by regular employment, civil laws, police protection, and etcetera. Maslow wrote:

The average adult in our society generally prefers a safe, orderly, predictable, lawful, organized world, which he can count on and in which unexpected, unmanageable, chaotic, or other dangerous things do not happen, and in which, . . . he has powerful protectors who shield him from harm.⁴

In lieu of unsatisfied physiological needs, gratification of these safety needs then dominates an individual’s motivation. Just as in the case of physiological needs, the safety needs may well become the sole determinant of a man’s behavior and affect his entire outlook on the world. His current state of affairs and prospects for the future impact his adherence to cultural values and moral judgments in order to adequately provide for his safety needs. As discussed earlier in the case of democratic reversals to authoritarian governments, the threat of chaos and violence may produce a regression from higher order needs to satisfy the prepotent safety needs. “A common, almost expectable reaction is the easier acceptance of dictatorships or of military rule,”⁵ in the face of anarchy or chaos.

Love or Belongingness Needs

Next in the hierarchy is the need for love or a sense of belonging. A person with a fair degree of security, reasonably stable environment, and regular income, now begins to sense the need for companionship, friends, and family, and the need for a particular position or place within his particular group. Maslow associates this desire with the animal instinct “to flock, to join, to belong.”⁶ “We still underplay the deep importance of the neighborhood, of one’s territory, of one’s clan, of one’s own kind, one’s class, one’s gang, one’s familiar working colleagues.”⁷

Fulfillment of this need appears to be the driving force for human identity discussed earlier in chapter 2. Perhaps the belongingness need will always lead people to distinguish themselves from one another by forming collective groups or societies. Clearly, human identity and ethnic division have been in existence for centuries and are not new phenomena of the twentieth century. What is curious about this need is how this tendency for identity leads to conflict. Human identity naturally seems to result in conflicts between different groups of people, perhaps as a self-reinforcing mechanism or simply the result of collective competition for scarce resources to fulfill other basic needs. While identity conflict may be common, genocidal violence and attempts at mass ethnic extermination should not be linked to the normal gratification of the belongingness need. “Ethnic conflict does not equate to genocide.”⁸

Maslow, like his teacher Sigmund Freud, emphasized the power of the love need and positioned it in a fairly prominent place in the hierarchy of needs. However, Maslow treated the issue of the love need slightly differently than Freud’s diagnosis, which claimed that all human motivation to be of a sexual nature. Maslow separated the need

for sex from the need for love, and further explained that fulfilling the love need involved both the giving and receiving of respect and/or affection from other individuals. Maslow viewed sex as more of a multidimensional need that fulfilled physiological needs as well as esteem and love needs. While it may seem abstract to tie war and violence with the need for sexual fulfillment, even Waltz makes a connection between hostile behavior and the sexual need.

Esteem Needs

If the love needs are satisfied, the esteem needs materialize, which account for the need of people to have a “stable, firmly based, high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect . . . and for the esteem from others.”⁹ The need for high self-esteem refers to the motivation of individuals to discover an inner strength of self-belief and self-confidence. It is revealed in a feeling of independence and buoyancy that comes from a certain competence level. The esteem need also includes the innate desire for reputation and prestige that comes from the high regard of others. This includes the aspiration for status, fame and glory, recognition, and appreciation. When this need is gratified, an individual feels self-confident, worthy, strong, and necessary. However, when this need is frustrated, it leads to feelings of inferiority, weakness, and helplessness. These feelings in turn give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends. The most stable and healthy form of self-esteem is based on the earned respect from others rather than self-proclaimed fame or superfluous celebrity.

Self-actualization Needs

Finally at the apex of the hierarchical pyramid comes the need for self-actualization. This is the need of fulfilling one’s destiny and becoming everything that

one is capable of becoming. Even with all other needs met, a person will become discontented if not allowed to pursue personal dreams, goals, and ambitions. This need varies greatly from person to person. In one individual it may take the form of the desire to be an ideal mother, in another it may be expressed athletically, and in still another it may be expressed in painting pictures or inventions. The need to know and understand is included under this heading of self-actualization. Self-actualization is the key to what Maslow refers to as savoring the “peak experience” of individual free will. The fulfillment of this need largely depends on each person’s individual situation. Desires, expectations, and choices may be very limited by an individual’s environment.

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs presents a logical order to the motivations of human beings. It is universal in the general sense, but is subject to the relative nature of a person’s environment and his personality. The fulfillment of basic needs is important not only to the warlord, but to all inhabitants within a failed state. Maslow provides a general framework of needs and motivation, but his pragmatic approach sidesteps the larger question of how the nature of man affects the fulfillment of these needs. Living in the tumultuous period of religious inquisitions, Thomas Hobbes described man’s state of nature, and how states or “leviathans” form out of the necessity of collective security.

Hobbesian State of Nature and Social Contracts

According to Hobbes, a British seventeenth century philosopher, nature makes men so equal in the faculties of mind and body that, while some dominate with the mind, others dominate with the body. The differences in the capabilities of men are not considerable, especially in the realm of intellect. From this equality of ability arises the equality of hope in attaining our ends. If any two men enjoy the same thing, which they

cannot both simultaneously enjoy, they become enemies, and on the way to their end, endeavor to destroy or subdue the other. If one man possesses an advantage, whether wealth, property, or knowledge, he can expect others to prepare forces to deprive him, not only of the fruits of his labor, but his life and liberty. This leads to the inherent element of distrust among men. The only rational method for providing security is to acquire the power to conquer and dominate other men in anticipation of this invasion. It is important for a man to display a powerful appearance to generate respect and value for his existence among other men.¹⁰

The nature of man leads to conflicts and quarrels in three ways. The first way is by competition, which motivates man to invade for conquest in order to increase his power, influence, and control over others. If he has power over others, he is better able to guarantee his own security. From the perspective of the invader, it encourages violence in the absolute gains of controlling another's resources of power. This then leads to the second source of human conflict, which, from the perspective of the invaded, gives rise to the innate diffidence or distrust between men. Diffidence breeds conflict for safety's sake to defend one's own sphere of control. Here lies the security dilemma. The forces under the control of one man to defend his property may also be used to conquer or seize another's property. Without any guarantee that these forces are strictly defensive, this requires the escalation and struggle for more power between the two men. The last source of conflict is glory, which encourages violence in a way that furthers a man's reputation and respect within this struggle for power and influence.

Therefore, the Hobbesian state of nature for man is one of constant war, with periods of hostilities and nonhostilities. Periods of time without actual fighting are not

states of peace. To Hobbes, in the state of nature, short periods between open hostilities were episodes where the will and disposition of man compelled him to plan for future violence. Peace was a separate state of existence that man in his state of nature could not occupy. Without a common power, or leviathan, to keep all people in awe, man continues to exist in either the state of actual fighting or the uncertain period between fighting, neither of which provides for a man's security. All energies must be focused on the survival in this state of constant war. Without security, there is no time or resources to pursue industrial advancement, scientific knowledge, or artistic endeavors.

[The] general inclination of all mankind, [is] a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he has present, without the acquisition of more.¹¹

In this light, Hobbes described the natural rights of man. The right of nature allows man the liberty to use power in order to preserve his life. This right exists without any restriction other than that of his own aptitude to select the means that best provide for his security. The law of nature prevents him from engaging in rational acts that would intentionally destroy him or remove the means to protect him. In the state of nature, there are no external impediments or moral absolutes other than the obligation of self-preservation and the liberty of rational means. Therefore, natural law permits uncivilized acts such as murder, rape, and theft, and hence the reason Hobbes called the state of nature brutal and nasty. "The life [of] man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."¹² Hobbes was not alone in his thinking. John Locke among many others viewed this condition of anarchy as "unthinkable, natural, and barbaric."¹³

Within this state of nature there can never be security, which leads to two general rules of reason. The first rule says, “Every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.”¹⁴ The second rule states: “A man willing, when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men; as he would allow other men against himself.”¹⁵ As long as men have the natural right to do anything they want, man will be in a state of war. The mutual transfer of rights by men to a sovereign, in a voluntary act that is beneficial to all parties, is considered a social contract. The surrender of individual rights to an all-powerful sovereign prevents chaos, anarchy, and violence. Rousseau and Hobbes both believed in the role of the sovereign to define the terms of the social contract and enforce them, but not necessarily bound to any specific terms of the social contract. In fact, even tyranny is considered better than anarchy; there is nothing worse than anarchy or extended civil war in this Hobbesian state of nature. This may account for the reluctant acceptance of warlordism by some inhabitants within failed states, in that warlords provide some degree of security from the state of nature, albeit very limited.

In the interest of protecting life and property, social contracts and primitive social structures form out of the collective interests of the majority. Individuals agree to a bargain with the state to protect themselves against a war of all against all. Through the transference of their personal rights to the leviathan in exchange for security, individuals grant the state sole power for the legitimate use of force. The fear of the state of nature causes man to submit his rights to a leviathan who guarantees individual security and

domestic peace. This leads to the Westphalian system of states and to a similar security dilemma that had existed in man's state of nature. In the international state of nature, where no sovereign exists to dominate the actions of states, the struggle for power fosters the conditions for war between states, not individuals.

Failed states bring about an interesting inversion to the Hobbesian state of nature and the creation of nation-states. States are normally regarded as places of refuge and stability, not places of danger and chaos. Nation-states were theoretically created by the social contract to safeguard domestic peace and security. As a result of the anarchical system of independent states, there exists a security dilemma that forces nations to prepare for international war. Interestingly, in the present international setting where there is a mostly peaceful environment between states, the absence of the security dilemma appears to be undoing the glue of many nation-states. Wars in the last twenty years have predominantly been civil wars as opposed to interstate wars. International peace appears to be a catalyst for internal state conflict that causes instability in weak states. When weak states collapse under this pressure, a failed state emerges from the ashes, epitomizing the Hobbesian state of nature. Armed anarchy and self-help then reemerge as a way of life for the inhabitants of a failed state.

The Effect of Warlords on Societal Development

In the "Nature of Warlordism," Abdirizak Hassan describes warlordism "as a paradigm of power politics in this condition of state absence and lawlessness."¹⁶ He argues that despite the limited claims of legitimacy based on the absence of any enforceable order, warlordism is not all about lawlessness and mayhem. "[Warlordism] has a life (reason), sense of direction (goal), and adheres to its own norms (laws)."¹⁷

The life of a warlord is characterized by a constant and impeding insecurity and suspicion to the level of paranoia. He is plagued by the unsettling realization that he has inflicted gross inhumanities and looted much of the state's public and private wealth. Warlords thrive on the dynamics of sheer survival and justify their shrewd plotting and cold, brutal tactics by their continued existence. Consequently, a warlord should be expected to adhere tightly to his power base and not willingly dismantle his authority and control for the sake of the nation.

The goal of a warlord is to deny any form of justice except that which is of the warlord's own making and taste. It is a justice that paints him as a benevolent moral statesman, and as a "hero who has struggled and dearly sacrificed for the common good of the nation as a whole."¹⁸ The warlord envisions either a never-ending continuation of the domestic disorder or surviving until such a point that he is able to reach the apex of power as the head of state. In determining a warlord's goals, Hassan claims that a warlord senses a consciousness of right and wrong with his wanton desires and criminal acts against humanity. Hassan claims that the warlord's guilt convinces him of the necessity to perpetuate the domestic chaos and violence in order to avoid justice by a higher authority. His paranoia against the potential cry for international justice shapes his resolve against any nascent state institutions or international intervention, even when promised a blanket of amnesty for his actions. However, in the Hobbesian state of nature, where all things go when survival is at stake, a warlord may also feel justified in his actions. Guilt implies a sense of wrongdoing, but warlords may not share the same opinion of right and wrong with leaders of the I.C. sent to bring justice to the failed state.

The warlords use a set of operational laws and norms that result in a balance of power with other warlords or enemies. They involve themselves in a struggle for power, and form tactical alliances for the purposes of confronting an emerging dominant warlord. However, even a successful alliance of cooperating warlords is rarely able to transform itself into a new national coalition. The interests of the warlords are limited to promoting their own private power interests and the consolidation of the alliance into a new state government implies the loss of some political power. Forming a new state government with one of the coalition warlords serving as new head of state is exactly the reason for the coalition forming in the first place--the coalition formed to prevent the consolidation under a single dominant warlord. And so the perpetual state of conflict continues.

The state of nature that Hobbes wrote about in the seventeenth century predicted that in the absence of a sovereign state, societies would fall down the slippery slope of anarchy and chaos. To avoid the state of nature, people formed states by a social contract to serve their collective security interests. By the transference of an individual's natural rights to the state, states were now granted the monopoly on the use of force. Without this monopoly, the state would not survive. The problem with Hobbes' model of the social contract in failed states is that the collective interest never gets a chance to form the leviathan. The private interests of a warlord overwhelm the collective interests of the majority. His control of force, and paranoia for survival, lead, as Hobbes predicted, to a condition of anarchy, and a life that is short, nasty, and brutish. There is no time or resources for the development of a society because the energy devoted to the warlords' struggle for power and survival is absolute. All remnants of civilized society are

destroyed in the chaos of the failed state. The private interests of the warlords' struggle for power paralyzes any chance for collective interests to rescue the failed state and restore a civil society.

Realism and Power

This section builds on the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature and introduces the theory of political realism. The architect of political realism, Hans Morgenthau, delineates the concepts of power politics or “realpolitik” which describes the relationships between states. First, this section discusses the fundamentals of realism and how states define their interests. Then this section describes the sources and instruments of state power, and how the struggle for power leads to international peace by establishing a balance of power. Next, it discusses the differences between realism and liberalism as they apply to the democratic peace theory. After that, it explains the realist view of the role of the state in domestic peace. And, finally, the last portion of this section shows the link between realism, warlords, and interventions.

The Theory of Realism

Realism is a pragmatic approach to international relations that attempts to bring order and meaning to events that might otherwise appear to be disconnected and meaningless. Realism is a theory of political actions based on rational human behavior and empirical evidence, not abstract moral philosophies or universal ethics. The theory exists within the school of thought that interactions between states are a result of the inherent nature of man. According to Hans Morgenthau, the father of realist theory, the world is an amalgamation of people with opposing interests and conflicting moral principles. To improve the world or make the world a safer place, it is more effective to

pursue a policy that balances the interests of conflicting parties as opposed to one that pursues a universal moral agenda. Realism guides political behavior towards a system of checks and balances, and aims at the realization of a lesser evil rather than an absolute good.

In Morgenthau's book *Politics among Nations*, he outlines the two primary principles of political realism. First, the laws of nature governing human behavior are objective and timeless and these same laws influence interstate relationships. Second, states pursue interests defined in terms of power, not elusive motives, ideological preferences, or ethical schemes. Max Weber echoes this idea that "interests, not ideas, dominate directly the acts of men."¹⁹ For example, from the perception of a realist, the Soviet Union's aggressive foreign policies were not founded on the communist doctrine of promoting proletarian revolutions but to expand Soviet power. In the same way, democratization as a foreign policy should not be pursued because of its moral virtues. Instead democratization is a policy of power, promoting American interests, guaranteeing U.S. security, and expanding the U.S. sphere of influence.

State Power

John Spanier defines state power in his book *Games that Nation's Play* as "the capacity to influence the behavior of other states in accordance with one's objectives." In realism, international relations become a struggle for power among states, each seeking the upper hand at controlling or influencing the actions of other states. While the laws of nature are objective and timeless, political actions governed by interests of power are subjectively derived within the existing political and cultural environment. Hans Morgenthau observes:

Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. . . . Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement.²⁰

There are many sources of state power. The primary sources are geography (borders, rivers, access to the sea), national resources (food and raw materials), industrial capacity, military preparedness (technology, leadership, and quantity and quality of armed forces), population, national character, and national morale.²¹ Some of the sources are more qualitative than quantitative, and some more stable than others. In any regard, states wield their power in four ways: through military, economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of power. These instruments of power are the means that a state uses to achieve its ends, which are ultimately used to acquire more power. Military force may be the most direct and efficient use of state power, but its use may carry unintended consequences. The instrument of economic power uses trade to exploit a state's need for certain goods and service. Foreign policy goals can be attained to some degree with incentives and disincentives involving the trade with other states. Diplomatic power involves the communications and negotiations with other states, and its effectiveness is related to the clout of the state. The instrument of diplomatic power manifests itself in official treaties, agreements, alliances, negotiations, mediations, and recognition.²² Informational power is the power to control the truth. It is measured in the ability of a state to influence other states by the presentation of facts and information.

The Balance of Power

The struggle for power leads to a condition of international relationships that Morgenthau calls the "balance of power." The balance of power concept not only refers

to the current distribution of power amongst states, but also includes the policies and actions aimed at maintaining this state of affairs. The struggle for power between sovereign entities inevitably leads to a stable, equilibrium of power. “The balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations.”²³ Balance or equilibrium is a universal concept anytime you have separate and independent forces at work. It applies in many sciences, as well as the domestic politics of pluralistic societies.

It is the purpose of all such equilibriums to maintain stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it. If the goal were stability alone, it could be achieved by allowing one element to destroy or overwhelm the others and take their place. Since the goal is stability plus preservation of all elements in the system, the equilibrium must aim at preventing any element from gaining ascendancy over the others.²⁴

States that do not pursue interests in terms of power become susceptible to moral excess and political folly, and bring instability to the system. Sustaining peace in the international environment results from policies that maintain the status quo equilibrium of power. If one state becomes significantly more powerful than its neighbors, forces will cause the other states to form alliances and build armaments in such a way to rebalance the scale of power.

Realism and the Democratic Peace Theory

The realist balance of power theory is a convincing political argument for maintaining peace, but recall the democratic peace theory from chapter 1. According to liberals, the democratic peace theory invalidates these forces as they apply to democratic states and discovers peace in a different way. “The liberal commitment to individual freedom gives rise to foreign policy ideology and the governmental institutions that work

together to produce democratic peace. . . . Liberals trust those states they consider to be fellow liberal democracies and see no reason to fight them. '25 Realists contend that states will still seek to balance against each other, regardless of their political affinities. They argue against liberal claims of democratic peace and point to historical examples where democratic states went to war with one another. For instance, Realists claim that Wilhelmine Germany was a democracy, and posit that World War I was then a war of democracy against democracy adhering to the balance of power forces. However, liberals claim that Germany was not a liberal democracy and followed policies that were undemocratic. Therefore, Britain and America did not perceive Germany to be a liberal democracy, and went to war with Germany because of the perceived threat to liberal democracy.

Recall that democratic peace doesn't necessarily imply an absence of war or that democracies are not hostile. In fact, democracies are quite hostile to authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies. However, liberals contend that this is not due to the belligerent nature of democracy, but rather a response to the aggressive policies of nondemocratic states. Democratic peace simply states that liberal democracies will not engage in war against each other.

The liberals and realists each present a different perspective on which forces determine state behavior. John Owen attempts to reconcile these differences by asserting that it depends on the actors; some actors are realists, some are liberals. As a means of synthesizing the two theories, he links the elements of power to the perceived intentions of a state. Power, while still an important part of the framework defining national interests, would be just one of several factors. Democratic peace then exists because of a

reduced perception of threat from the power of another liberal democratic state based on its peaceful intentions.

However, the democratic peace theory does not automatically lend itself to assume a state's peaceful intentions. Liberal democracy relies on the ability to manifest individualism in material wealth. Democratic societies have trouble coping with inflationary forces, high unemployment, rampant crime, and urban anarchy. When peace does not bring prosperity, these social and economic forces may lead a depressed state to adopt aggressive policies. Liberalism is also notorious for its tendency to destroy traditional ways of life and sources of meaning. By promoting the values of self and freedom, liberalism endangers traditional morals and cultural values. This may appear threatening and exert pressure on liberal governments to adopt hostile policies toward one another. For liberal democratic peace, democratic governments must be able to fulfill their promise of individual freedom in concert with economic growth, stability, and security while at the same time respecting religious and cultural traditions.

Realist perspective on the Role of the State

Realism and liberalism also differ in the principles that lead to domestic peace. Recall that in chapter 1, liberalism developed domestic peace by the mutual respect for the unalienable human rights that allowed each individual to pursue his or her own interests (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness). The environment of toleration and compromise developed to allow everyone pursuit of their rights, which helped seal domestic peace in a liberal state. To a realist, the legal order of force generates domestic peace, not "fuzzyheaded" liberal ideas. "States are the compulsory organizations of society with the legal order that determines the conditions under which society may

employ its monopoly of organized violence for the preservation of peace and order.’²⁶

While the power of state is essential for domestic peace, realists recognized that power alone is not sufficient to maintain peace in pluralistic societies.

According to realism, there are three conditions for domestic peace: suprasectional loyalties, expectation of justice, and overwhelming force. First, suprasectional loyalties relate the interrelationship of economic, social, and religious groupings within a pluralistic society. The members of a particular religious group may or may not be a part of the same economic or social group. It therefore becomes difficult to completely separate both human identity and group interests. Pluralism of domestic groupings and conflicts tends to impress upon participants the relativity of their interests and thus the need to mitigate clashes between opposing groups. Pluralism reduces the intensity of identification beyond a level that overrides national loyalty, which is embedded in all members of society. National loyalty then acts as a restraining and limiting influence, which is an important factor for domestic peace.

The second factor is the expectation of justice. These are the mechanisms in place to address specific claims by particular groups. Moral abstractions, such as democracy, social justice, equality, and civil liberty can both consolidate a society and alienate social groups. Peaceful change occurs in the expectation of a societal mechanism that allows groups to “submit their claims for justice to the arbitrament of public opinion, of elections, of parliamentary votes, of examination boards, and the like.”²⁷

The third factor of domestic peace is overwhelming power, which a society uses to forestall any attempts at breaching domestic peace. Overwhelming power resides in two areas. First, there is the tangible power of the compulsory agent (police and regular

military forces) to use armed force within the state's monopoly of organized violence. Second, there is the intangible aspect of overwhelming social pressure by the majority. So long as conflicting social groups remain within the limits of the law and avail themselves of peaceful means, the state's use of force is neutral with regard to the claims of these groups. However, the compulsory agent of force cannot always remain neutral, especially when the legal order that establishes it is challenged. Normally the existence of the state's monopoly of organized violence rarely makes it necessary for the compulsory agent to act. The incentive to escalate collective disturbances is thus restrained or availed by the overwhelming power of a state.

Morgenthau describes the essential role of a state in the maintenance of domestic peace in three ways. First the state provides the legal continuity of the national society. Second, the state provides institutionalized agencies and processes for social change and economic improvement. Lastly, the state provides for the agencies to enforce its laws. Similar to its IR application, realism prescribes a balance of power within the state among hostile groups. Hostile groups are motivated by their pursuit of power, and are often inspired to act violently against other social groups. Violent, divisive conflicts by social groups place pressure on the state by directly attacking the state's infrastructure and causing dissension within the body politic.

The peace of a society whose intergroup conflicts are no longer limited, restrained, and neutralized by overriding loyalties, whose processes of social change no longer sustain the expectation of justice in all major groups, and whose organized forces of compulsion are no longer sufficient to impose conformity upon those groups--the peace of such a society cannot be saved by the state, however strong.²⁸

Realism's Correlation to Warlords

How does realism apply to warlords in failed states? First, the failed state environment provides clear evidence of man's instinctual state of nature that Hobbes described. Failed states are anarchical and promote self-help. Second, the interests of warlords are defined in terms of power similar to the sovereign state. In *Warlord Politics*, Bill Reno wrote:

The major difference between weak state rulers and warlords is that warlord interests are better described by greed and the aspiration for personal power. Warlords jettison all pretenses of serving the collective interests of the public and aspire for their own personal interests of power. This absence of collective, versus private, interest is a major distinguishing feature of warlord politics.²⁹

Third, the sources of power for a state are similar to the sources of power for warlords. While not the legitimate authority in society, warlords control territory, population, economic mechanisms, and military force. Likewise, warlords exert their influence with the same instruments of power (diplomatic, information or propaganda, military, and economic) that states use. Because warlords operate outside the legitimacy of state sovereignty, they feel less constrained by the artificial borders that divide state authority. Warlords based in failed states infiltrate into bordering states and attempt to control markets and populations through extortion and violence. Warlords are much more amenable to the views of Mao Tse-tung when he wrote that, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."³⁰ Fourth, the warlord environment is governed by a struggle for power and influence with other warlords. This struggle for power leads to a balance of power arrangement within the failed state. What is different is that this may or may not lead to peace. Peace in the international environment is based on this balance of power,

but within failed states, even with a balance of power between warlords, there is open violence amongst forces loyal to the warlords.

At this point, realism seems to be a better model to begin understanding warlords and their reaction to interventions by the I.C. within the failed state. Reforms and economic aid by the I.C. to strengthen weak or failed states will only be manipulated to serve the private interests of the warlord, not the collective interests of the populace. The warlords will cooperate only as much as necessary to secure international aid, reinforce their positions against other rival warlords, and posture themselves for a place in the new political architecture. Warlords understand power, and will design policies to acquire more of it. Warlords perceive liberalism as the weak, moral agenda of the West.

Realism also offers the perspective of the state's role securing domestic peace. As a society approaches the Hobbesian state of nature, power and survival become the interests of societal groups. In failed states, the only chance for ever reaching the three conditions of domestic peace may be through the overwhelming strength of U.S. and coalition forces. Early attempts at domestic peace and meeting the basic needs of the populace may initially follow the realist line of reasoning with respect to power, with the eventual goal of establishing conditions that Huntington described earlier in chapter 2 as those conditions suitable for democratization. For democratic peace to be successful, the popular aspirations of political liberty must eventually rise to the level of precedence beyond all other needs. With a solid footing in the realist and liberal philosophies, chapter 4 will address the appropriate policies towards warlords aimed at bringing about democratic peace in a failed state.

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 22.

² Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), 24.

³ Ibid., 36.

⁴ Ibid., 39.

⁵ Ibid., 43.

⁶ Ibid., 44.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Crocker, 2.

⁹ Colin Wilson, *New Pathways in Psychology: Maslow and the Post-Freudian Revolution*, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), 162-163.

¹⁰ During the interview with MAJ Laurence, he commented about whether this is a generic species trait, or limited to the male only. There is a dispute as to where this trait is generic to both males and females. Steven Laurence, major, U.S. Army Officer in Bosnia. Interview by author, 25 April 2003, Fort Leavenworth. Personal interview. Military quarters, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

¹¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Part I* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), 77.

¹² Ibid., 101.

¹³ Abdirizak Adam Hassan (Durqun), "The Nature of Warlordism: Insights and Analysis," *Somalia Watch* webpage [document online]; available from <http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivemar03/030319201.htm>; accessed 19 March 2003; 1.

¹⁴ Hobbes, 105.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Hassan, 1.

¹⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Marianne Weber, *Max Weber* (Tuebingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, 1926), 347-348.

²⁰ Morgenthau, 9.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 112-140.

²² Ted Davis, Robert H. Dorf, and Robert D. Walz, "A brief introduction to Concepts and Approaches in the Study of Strategy," reprinted as Lesson 1, Reading A for *C500 Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting*, Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 2002), 10.

²³ Morgenthau, 9

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Owen, 172.

²⁶ Morgenthau, 487

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 485.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 488.

²⁹ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 3.

³⁰ John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 841.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF WARLORDS IN A DEMOCRATIZATION STRATEGY

The previous chapter expounds on Hobbes' state of nature and describes its relationship to warlords and failed states. It explained the interests of warlords in terms of power using the conventional theory of realism. This chapter applies these fundamental concepts and argues that, in general, the policy of encouraging new institutions is the only policy capable of democratizing failed states. First described in chapter 2, this political strategy makes three critical points. First, the underlying conditions of a failed state are such that the existing institutions are incapable of forming a new order and will require alternative structures. The existing institutions are the warlords' and due to their personal interests in power--not the collective societal interests--they are incapable of forming a new order. Second, that new institutions and leaders will develop once a security umbrella is put in place by a neutral intervening force. The leaders of the international intervention would require warlords to participate only as political figures and would forcibly remove their military power if necessary. Third, the operational environment demands a lengthy intervention, more costly and intrusive than one built on accommodating the warlord militias. Overall, the strategy of encouraging new institutions presupposes a more forceful policy with regard to establishing new democratic institutions. Warlordism is considered the primary source of the problem in failed states, not the basis for a solution.

Warlordism is more akin to gang warfare than to a genuine form of politics and government. It is inherently flawed by its illegitimate acquisition of power, brutal, cold-blooded tactics, and corrupt, criminal practices. The popular support for a warlord is

tenuous and is largely in response to the fear and intimidation perpetuated by the warlord. In order to bring about significant political change and long-term stability through democratization, the warlord's influence must be marginalized or eliminated. Despite a warlord's flowery rhetoric to restore peace and stability, as soon as a warlord's power is jeopardized by political reform, he is likely to act in a violent way to prevent the loss of power. To overcome the warlord's subversive tactics, the intervening force uses overwhelming military power to neutralize the warlord's militia and to establish a blanket of security to begin the process of building a democratic state.

Once the society is liberated from the warlord menace, the intervening force helps form new political institutions with the moderate leaders of society. Elders, religious leaders, and other important social figures help the society make the transition away from an illegitimate leviathan of a warlord to a more representative governmental system. Operating within the security umbrella of the intervening forces, these legitimate political forces act as the interim government to restore basic law and civil order within their local communities. The inhabitants become mobilized in an economic reconstruction program that applies international aid and private economic investment to rebuild, repair, and/or restore basic services. During this interim period, refugees return home and are peacefully reintegrated into the society. Supported by an information campaign that emphasizes the themes of peace, cooperation, and reconciliation, the nation embarks on a liberalization program that guarantees certain rights and responsibilities of all citizens. The intervening force retains its overwhelming presence to prevent both external and internal threats from jeopardizing the immature democracy. Next to sustaining a secure environment, one of the most important parts of this phase is to develop trust between the

former warring factions that allows compromise between parties rather than violence. Ideally, this spirit of compromise should emanate from the parties themselves, but years of civil war and strife may require the intervening force to act as the neutral arbitrator to help build good faith in their mutual agreements.

The interim government is eventually replaced by a constitutionally-based, democratic political system. Political parties compete in free and fair elections available to all members of society. This political system is formed on the liberal principles of universal human rights, majoritarian rule, peaceful compromise, and minority accommodation. Former warlords may be allowed to participate in the legitimate realm of political competition, but only under the careful scrutiny and supervision of the intervening force. The intervening force continues to provide the blanket of security but begins to prepare a professional army sworn to uphold the constitution and provide for national security. Social and economic reforms complete the transition from an aid-based economy to a market economy with international investment, industrialization, and training programs. Towards the end of democratization, the intervening coalition begins to transfer its monopoly on the use of force to the legitimate police and military forces that serve the state.

Democratization according to the Encourage New Institutions model is much more involved than the brief description above. Transforming a failed state into a burgeoning democracy is a complicated and lengthy process. The purpose of this chapter is not to present a complete democratization strategy. Rather, its principle purpose is to focus the argument on the appropriate theoretical basis upon which to devise an effective strategy to deal with warlords. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section

concentrates on warlords in the early phases of intervention. This section separates the issue into four areas: realism and warlord power, the dilemma of peacemakers, the battle for power, and disarmament and military reform. The second section provides some thoughts on democratic transition and consolidation. It introduces a deliberate shift in the democratization strategy away from realism and power interests to idealism and moral interests. Further, the second section of this chapter redefines the role of the state and develops a strategy that balances freedom, order, and equality to further the liberal democratic development.

Warlords and the Early Phase of Intervention

Realism and Warlord Power

Chapter 3 relates the phenomena of warlordism to the product of man's instinctual nature as defined by Thomas Hobbes. Weak states, led by corrupt and cruel administrations, implode, leaving behind a chaotic and disorganized political environment. Warlords then seize power by destroying the state's institutions and any visage of the legitimate political authority. Through force of arms and acts of intimidation, warlords loot the state's resources and usher in an era of anarchy, where fear and panic imprison the local populace. Acting as illegitimate leviathans, warlords pursue their interests of power and dominate society with ruthless military force. The warlord's armed militia and callous leadership are the primary sources of their de facto political power. Using brute force and terror, the warlords extort authority and respect from the legitimate or traditional leaders of society to support their relentless pursuit of more power. They compete for power and influence with other warlords operating within the failed state. This boundless struggle for power prompts them to secure their spheres

of influence by promoting fear and violence. Law, order, and traditional cultural norms become a victim of this chaotic competition for power.

The theory of realism explains the struggle for power as rational behavior among men. According to realism this struggle will eventually lead to a quasi-stable balance of power between the warlords in a failed state. The problem with this military and political environment is that the civil populace is held hostage to this power struggle. It is not the social contract of the state or legitimate leviathan that Hobbes envisioned. There is no guarantee for individual security, and, consequently, societies crumble in the chaos of anarchy. In addition, the boundless nature of warlord conflict gives rise to famine, genocide, and other atrocities. Realism not only explains the status quo within failed states in terms of an internal power struggle but also describes the ramifications of international intervention and democratization efforts. The realist actors in failed states are the warlords and realism predicts that conflicts will arise over any attempt to remove their grip on power. Limited humanitarian interventions may be tolerated to some degree, especially if they offer a direct or indirect means for more power, but holistic nation-building or democratization interventions are a different matter entirely.

While universally driven by the pursuit of power, each warlord responds differently to international interventions. Some warlords welcome interventions, while others vehemently oppose them. In either case, warlords attempt to manipulate the intervening forces in a way that best suits their personal power interests. Those warlords welcoming the intervention cooperate only as a means of securing a strategic advantage against another warlord. A good example of this occurred in the power struggle over the control of Mogadishu between the Hawiye and Habr Gidr clans. Ali Mahdi, the warlord

of the Hawiye clan, exploited the UNOSOM II forces as a way of attacking General Mohamed Aideed's SNA (Somali National Alliance) forces aligned with the Habr Gidr clan. Ali Mahdi was much weaker than Aideed and could not militarily or politically affect Aideed's power base on his own. Therefore, he partnered with the U.S. and U.N. coalition forces, cooperating in some cases or giving at least the appearance of cooperating. Ali Mahdi then attempted to isolate Aideed by accusing him of opposing the international peace process.¹

Other warlords portray the intervening forces as invaders or imperialists and rally ethnic groups to engage in open hostilities against them. In this way, they exploit the national identity in an effort to unite the warring clans and present themselves as a national hero. Once again, using the example of Somalia, Aideed and the SNA resented the heavy involvement of the U.N. into Somali affairs. Aideed responded to the encroachment on his power base by the UNOSOM II forces and rivals like Ali Mahdi by declaring war on the U.N. peacekeepers. The U.N. attacks on the SNA, especially the Abdi House assault on 12 June 1993, caused many non-Habr Gidr Somalis to sympathize and even join forces with the SNA. In addition to these new followers, Aideed consolidated his power base within the Habr Gidr clan by winning over those who had not agreed with his previous noncooperative policies.²

The Dilemma of the Peacemakers

Warlords represent the de facto leaders of the disordered state. An international force deployed to a region has little choice but to deal with the warlords. The decision of whether or not to deal with warlords is not a dilemma but an unavoidable reality. The real dilemma facing the intervening force is the choice of which approach it should take

towards warlords. Is it more advantageous to pursue a “soft” approach and try to persuade the warlords to accept a peaceful resolution or a “strong” approach that dictates the terms of peace? The warlords obviously prefer the soft approach, which allows them maneuvering room to manipulate the peace process. The warlords assert that only the warring factions themselves can resolve the nation’s obstacles to peace. In a March 1994 radio address in Nairobi, Kenya, General Aideed said, “We learned from all these governments and organizations that the world fully agreed and supports the SNA position to leave the Somalis to solve their problems. The intrusion on the lives and property in Somalia was a serious mistake.”³ There is some truth in the need to have buy-in from the local populace for a peaceful settlement. However, there are two problems with a warlord’s perception of this idea. First, a warlord is so driven by his personal quest for power that he is likely to stifle any peaceful desires within his clan. Second, peace and stability between warlords are incompatible with the democratic peace initiative. A democratic state will never result from this arrangement because it is not in the warlord’s interest to ever share power.

The flaw in the logic of the soft approach is that one must assume that a warlord comes to the bargaining table with interests other than power. Negotiations that lead to cease-fires and security agreements are always subordinate to the power interests of the warlord and are, therefore, viewed by the warlord as temporary and nonbinding. If it is in his interests, the warlord may establish a dialogue and support an environment that appears somewhat stable. However, as soon as the opportunity presents itself, the warlord will subvert the agreement and angle himself in a position that guarantees more power. In Somalia, UNITAF adopted the strategy of persuasion backed by firmness. However, the

agreements lacked depth and rarely were the warlords ever forced to live up to their promises. The resulting soft approach that intended to avoid conflict by seeking a peaceful solution in a consensus among the warlords only emboldened them to continue their pursuits of power.⁴

On the other hand, the strong approach risks alienation and open hostilities with the warlords' militia forces. This, of course, leads to a period of instability and a true test of the political will of the intervening forces. However, the strong approach allows the intervening force to operate from a position of clarity, dictating the terms of peace that will eventually lead to an environment suitable for democracy. The adoption of this approach stems from the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable gap between the interests of warlords and the interests of democracy. It is, therefore, imperative that the intervening forces have overwhelming power to eliminate or neutralize the warlords' forces. Although UNOSOM II realized the incompatibility of warlords in the democratization strategy, it lacked the overwhelming power and political will to implement a strategy that would neutralize the warring factions. Consequently, the mission in Somalia fell apart, and anarchy and chaos returned to southern Somalia.

The soft approach of accommodating the warlord militias appears promising at first because of the short-term objective of a stable and secure environment. However, it would seem that no matter what the short-term advantages may be, the warlord's interests would eventually lead to an inevitable confrontation with the intervening forces pursuing a policy of democratization. It would then seem better to deal with the "warlord problem" earlier rather than later. Democratization, the policy of returning political power to a peaceful, competitive forum of individuals and ideas, clashes with the warlord's interests

of acquiring personal power through armed force. Although cooperative negotiations may occur, the true interest of a warlord is in posturing himself to seize total control of state power. In light of these true interests, the policy of accommodating the warlord is a misguided approach to democratization and nation building. Despite the economic and political incentives offered to him by the I.C. to cooperate with the democratic process, the warlord is adverse to any loss of his personal power. In his mind, “It is better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.”⁵

The Battle for Power

In my discussion with an Army officer during one of my peacekeeping missions, he said, “The only thing these people understand is power. You have deal with them on their terms. If power is what they understand, then we must act from a position of overwhelming power.”⁶ The key interest of actors according to realism is power, which guarantees security. Realists believe that this is the way the world is and will always be. Human nature is unchanging, and military force is the only significant instrument of national power. Power in a failed state resides with the warlords. The intent of the intervention is to remove power from the warlords and reinvest it in a legitimate democratic government. This conflict of interests between the warlords and the intervening forces will inevitably lead to armed conflict. The center of gravity for the power struggle in the failed state is the local populace. Will they choose to continue the path of warlordism or cross over towards democratization?

Although conflict is inevitable, violence may not erupt immediately upon the arrival of the intervening forces. In some cases this is due to a prearranged agreement with the warlords that allows a limited role for the intervening force. In other cases,

warlords may adopt a “wait and see” strategy that continually assesses the strength, disposition, and intentions of the intervening forces. In the first two months of UNITAF, there was very little organized interference by the warlords against the U.N. forces securing the delivery of relief supplies to the Somali interior. Problems developed later as the U.N. mission expanded to encompass holistic nation building. In Afghanistan, the policy of U.S. forces with many of the warlords may be characterized by the saying, “Keep your friends close, your enemy’s closer.”⁷ The U.S. philosophy in Afghanistan is that if we pay the warlords for the security of our civil affairs teams and appoint them as governors, we will be in a better position to monitor their activities than if we completely isolated them.

Eventually though, this game of false cooperation will have to come to an end. Cooperation is only acceptable when it is within the power interests of the warlord. Outside of these interests, the warlords will gradually escalate the confrontations with the intervening force. It is an almost impossible task to persuade warlords to disband their militia, turn in their weapons, and submit their political power to the peaceful democratic process. However, this is exactly the task required for democratization to proceed. During an interview with a civil affairs officer serving in Afghanistan, he said, “Eventually, if we really want to rebuild this country we need to move away from “keep your friends close, your enemy’s closer” to “keep your friends close, kill your enemy”.”⁸

Once a conflict turns violent, the task of the intervening forces is twofold. They have to attack and destroy the warlords’ forces while at the same time pacifying and protecting the civilian populace. To do this, the intervening forces typically have many advantages. First, they typically have an overwhelming military superiority when it

comes to firepower, speed, technology, and logistics. In the case of Somalia, the capability of the U.S. weapons and military forces were far superior to all of the warlords' forces combined. Second, the intervening force typically has a large amount of funds with which they provide incentives for cooperation from the local populace. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is a large donor of money to programs that provide assistance to developing democratic countries. In 2001, USAID alone spent nearly 167 million dollars on democratization programs. Lastly, many other countries normally support the intervention, which provides both additional resources and moral support. The initial goal of the intervention is to defeat the warlords and win the hearts and minds of the inhabitants so that they view the intervening forces as liberators, not conquerors.

Allies are very important in the global task of democratizing failed states. With the advent of global terrorism and WMD, it is in the interests of all democracies to contribute to this democratization process. Broad coalitions are then able to share the costs of nation building. However, there are three important points about coalitions in the current international environment. First, a U.N. resolution may be necessary to legitimize an intervention. Second, the U.S. should lead the intervention but avoid becoming overly hegemonic in its influence; it should not want or need to dominate every aspect of the intervention. U.S. leadership is important because: (1) it sustains the commitment of the U.S. to the mission, (2) leverages U.S. political capital to encourage the participation of other democratic nations, and (3) brings the tremendous capability of the U.S. to bear on the problem. Third, allies are important not only in terms of sharing the burden but defusing any warlord propaganda claiming that the intervention is an imperialist

incursion of any single nation. In Bosnia, the multinational composition of IFOR, including Turkish and Russian soldiers, helped reassure the ethnic Muslim and Serb communities.

However, there are some trade offs and concerns when working with allies and coalition forces. First, there are concerns about military interoperability and wide-ranging capability differences. In Somalia, warlords attacked weaker forces to influence the effectiveness of the U.N. mission such as the attack on Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993. Second, the loyalty and command and control of a nation's armed forces become a sensitive issue, sometimes reaching the highest levels of government. Wesley Clark discussed this problem in his book *Waging Modern War* when he was the commander of NATO forces in the Kosovo War. Clark writes:

Unity of command was nominally through my headquarters, but in practice national command chains continued to shape and drive the campaign through connections directly to NATO-assigned forces and sometimes bypassing NATO, including the negotiations to end the fighting. Even within my U.S. chain of command, my subordinate component commanders were reporting to, and no doubt influenced by, members of a committee in Washington composed of the four Service Chiefs, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁹

Lastly, coalition members do not always share the same interests in the intervention. Some states may enter the democratization process with ulterior motives or interests that conflict with the coalition leadership. For example, U.S. forces still accuse the Italian forces of passing sensitive intelligence to Aideed's clan during UNOSOM II.

Despite the significant advantages of coalitions, warlords are still able to inflict considerable damage to an intervening force. There are three fundamentals of warlord tactics. First, warlords understand that it is futile to engage a conventionally superior

force head on. Rather, warlords will choose to combat their opponents on an asymmetric basis that emphasizes their own strengths and exposes the weaknesses of the intervening force. In Somalia, Aideed chose urban terrain to fight the U.S. and other U.N. forces; a complex and congested environment that was as alien to these forces as it was intimately familiar to Aideed's supporters. The weapons technology that had given rise to speculation about a revolution in military affairs proved ineffective, if not counterproductive, for close-in urban warfare. By the time American forces resorted to antitank guided missiles to root out snipers, it had become apparent that the firepower, which had demolished much of the Iraqi Army, was ill suited to urban combat. The use of attack helicopters to scatter angry crowds of Somalis resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. As a result, the U.S. military's tactics and sophisticated, precision-guided weapons systems, which had worked so well in the 1991 Gulf War, did little to minimize noncombatant injuries. Urban combat in Mogadishu made it very difficult for peacekeepers to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants.¹⁰

Second, warlords realize that public opinion is the political center of gravity for the U.S. Although there are a plethora of variables that affect the public's perception of nation-building, American casualties appear to be the most influential factor on the steadfastness of America's elected leaders. Warlords in Somalia found that it was not necessary to defeat the U.S. militarily in order to influence the political decisions made by U.S. leaders. Aideed's hit and run tactics and light mortar attacks, whether intentional or not, continually eroded the confidence of U.S. decision makers in the U.N. nation-building mission. However, the relative significance of casualties may be changing. As a result of the 11 September attacks, there seems to be more of a willingness by America to

tolerate casualties in these types of interventions, at least those being led by the U.S.

Although democratization is still in its early stages in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has yet to be seen what effect casualties will have on these continuing missions.

Third, warlords realized that the success of these interventions was ultimately tied to the confidence and acceptance of the local populace. The warlords escalated their campaign of fear and terror against the society and nascent leaders. They hoped to convince the members of their society that they would be more secure under their protection than under that of the intervening forces. In addition, warlords of post-colonial failed states tried to exploit national and ethnic identities to incite anticolonial feelings against the foreign military forces. They also used extortion and bribery to gather intelligence on their own society and ensure loyalty against the intervention. And, just as realism predicted, they established alliances with other warlords to fight against the intrusive interventions.

The battle for power is often the decisive element of the democratization campaign. It becomes a battle of will and, ultimately, targets the hearts and minds of the individuals residing in the failed state who must decide which offers more security- the intervening force or the warlord? There are two final issues concerning the battle for power. The first is that it is possible to erode the political power of a warlord without ever firing a shot. Andrew Nastios, the chief administrator for humanitarian relief in Somalia during much of UNITAF and UNOSOM II, and now director of USAID, insisted that negotiations with the Somali warlords take place in the presence of the clan's tribal elders. This was a way of shifting legitimacy away from the warlords and back to the elders. "The warlords did not like it, but they had no choice; this arrangement sent a

strong message to the community about U.S. government support for traditional authority figures.”¹¹ The second issue is that the incentives for warlords should not outweigh the incentives for the common citizens to cooperate with the democratization process. The purpose of medical and economic aid incentives should be to actively influence the behavior of individual citizens to accept the benefits of democratization, and veer away from the warlord’s power.

Disarmament and Military Reform

The primary source of a warlord’s power is the armed militia. The armed militia allows the warlord to terrorize, coerce, and intimidate the local populace. The fact that other clans have weapons further amplifies the desire to acquire additional weapons and more power. This arms race results from the same security dilemma faced by states. Consequently, military force completely overshadows all other instruments of power in failed states. It is these armed militias that are the biggest impediment to establishing peace and security in a failed state. The armed militias are usually undisciplined, poorly trained, and under paid. As a result, members of the warlord’s armed militia participate in random acts of violence and illicit banditry that terrorize innocent civilians.

The problem with past attempts at nation building is that disarmament of the militias was never seen as the remedy to the immediate problem. President Clinton stated, “Fundamentally the solution to Somalia’s problems is not a military one. It is political.”¹² While in the long-term this may have been true, Somalia’s problem in the short-term was very much a military problem. Any time there is a tendency to resort to violence as a means to advance a political agenda, one is dealing with a military problem. There are others in the government who claim disarmament should only come after the

reconciliation of the political parties, ethnic groups, or religious factions. Herman J.

Cohen, the former Department of State's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, testified to Congress on December 17, 1992:

I think the whole disarmament issue has to be put in context of the whole political process. I think the argument we have been seeing lately of whether the coalition forces should disarm is a rather sterile argument. . . . Disarmament comes with political reconciliation among the armed groups. . . . They will get together and decide on the encampment of armed forces, on the collection or arms, and then the storage of arms pending a final political settlement. . . . We feel it is a lot better to reduce arms through negotiations and reconciliation and have the Somalis themselves decide on how to control arms than to try to eliminate arms through a coercive method-a method for which we have no time in any event.¹³

Past experience strongly suggests that this approach is completely backward. It is not pragmatic to expect reconciliation to occur when armed militias roam the countryside and urban areas. Generally, disarmament does not follow reconciliation; reconciliation can only occur after disarmament.

There is a second fundamental argument that supports the necessity for disarmament. Besides helping promote the reconciliation of warring factions by removing the threat of armed violence, the use of force must be restricted to the state, not warlord militias or private armies. One of the essential elements of a state is that it alone maintains the monopoly on the use of force within its borders. Without professional military institutions, this becomes an essential role for the intervening force. It alone must establish itself as having the monopoly on the use of force within a failed state. Disarmament then becomes a vital part of the state building mission; it is absolutely essential to disarm the warlord militias.

Disarmament is the reduction or elimination of certain or all armaments from within the society. Complete disarmament of a failed state is an extremely difficult and perhaps utopian mission for any military force. It is complicated for two reasons. First, as we have already noted, the warlords are seeking to maintain their position of power. The warlords will attempt to hide weapons in cache sites and attack the intervening force to avoid the seizure of their sources of military power. Second, citizens will feel the need to have weapons to protect their families and property from any real or imagined threats from bandits and thieves. We only have to recall Maslow's hierarchy of needs to understand that the security need of individuals is second only to their physiological needs. Unless the civilian populace trusts the intervening force for their personal security, it will be difficult to get the citizenry to peacefully turn in their weapons.

Disarmament may require house-to-house searches in some cases. One U.S. Army commander serving in Bosnia said he preferred a policy of complete disarmament even if it involved house-to-house search and seizures. He said, "Then we knew that only the bad guys, and not the law abiding citizens, would be carrying weapons."¹⁴ Other U.S. officers contend that there are second order consequences of aggressively searching every house and that we should avoid this intrusive activity. They assert that house-to-house searches build animosity in the hearts and minds of the citizens we are trying to win.¹⁵ There is no doubt that disarmament is a complex issues. However, despite its complexity, large-scale disarmament in some form is a must in order to proceed with democratization.

Concepts to Disarmament and Security:

Creating a Professional State Military Force

There are three concepts of disarmament and national security that are important for state building. The first is creating a professional, state military. This force must be separate from politics and warlords and sworn to uphold the integrity of the state and its constitution. The new force should be inclusive of all factions and, hopefully, serve as the melting pot for reintegrating society. The U.S., along with other members of the democratic coalition, must train this force to be professional and responsible to serving the security needs of its citizens. Recall in chapter 2 of this paper that to avoid transitional problems, the military needs a mission. One of the most important missions in many failed states is demining, which helps increase freedom of movement. Training the new military force centered on the military engineer branch provides a defensively oriented force that is trained with skills that serve both a military and a civilian purpose. The military must also be regularly paid and well disciplined.

Aggressive Time-Phased Disarmament Program

The second concept is that the disarmament strategy should be a time-phased program that lays out clear objectives and consequences for a failure to comply. Ideally, this would come in the form of an agreement by the warring factions themselves but would heavily involve the intervening force to ensure compliance. In retrospect, in the argument over whether UNITAF should have actively disarmed the warlord militias, the fourteen major Somali warlords had all agreed in principle to disarmament when they signed the Addis Ababa Agreement on January 8, 1993. However, UNITAF and UNOSOM II had neither a clear plan to conduct this disarmament nor the forces capable

of effectively executing this mission. First and foremost, disarmament requires that the intervening force have overwhelming power. It is not an effective strategy to send light forces without the shock effect of armor into urban areas to forcibly disarm warlords. This reinforces the realist idea of power discussed earlier. The intervening forces must defeat the warlords' will to resist by the demonstration or forceful employment of its overwhelming power. The demilitarization of Bosnia occurred with only minor incidents largely because a very sizeable and capable NATO force ensured the compliance of all parties according to the time frame agreed to in the Dayton accords.

There are several other components that are crucial for a successful demilitarization program. The first is securing the national borders to prevent new weapons from entering into the country. The second is a weapons registration program to accommodate individuals with some types of weapons to protect themselves from criminals. The third is a retraining program for members of the demobilized militia. The fourth is a weapons buy-back program. This program is somewhat controversial because of the mixed results from Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti.¹⁶ There are some that claim the weapons buy back program only removed inoperable weapons and military "junk" from the streets. However, any program that removes weapons, explosives, and ammunition in a peaceful way is a good supplement to an aggressive disarmament program. The last component is an effective verification, destruction, and cantonment plan for the confiscated weapons.

Dynamic Information Campaign

An effective information campaign can tremendously support a large-scale disarmament program by reducing the anxiety of the local populace. In failed states, there

is a tendency for rumors, unofficial media, and warlord propaganda to prey on the fears of the local populace. As we have noted earlier in this paper, many will be reluctant to submit their weapons to the intervening forces. Through print, audio, and television media, the information campaign can support the positive aspects of the program as well as promote other important reconciliation themes. An aggressive information campaign can also play a large role in recruiting members for the new national army and police forces, provide details about the disarmament program (which weapons aren't allowed, the location of turn-in sites, registration procedures, etc.), and offer rewards for information leading to hidden caches.

There are four major themes that summarize the preceding section for early interventions. First, warlords are "realists" who are driven by interests of power. Second, a warlord's power is directly related to his ability to wield fear and intimidation through the military instrument of power. Third, there is an irreconcilable difference between the interests of democracy and the interests of warlordism that will lead inevitably to conflict. Last, disarmament by the overwhelming power of an international coalition led by the U.S. is the best way to pave the road ahead for peace and reconciliation. However, this is only the first step in the democratization process. While there are many more challenges ahead, releasing the society from the warlords' grip of fear is the surest way of giving democracy a chance for success.

Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
From Realism to Idealism

The previous section of this paper argues for an aggressive and intrusive policy towards warlords following the logic of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau.

However, a strategy for democracy must transcend the basic interests of power and move towards the progressive principles of liberalism. This section discusses the philosophical aspects of democratization following the end of the warlord regimes; a period called post-warlordism. There are five parts to this section. The first is an analogy of nation building to childhood development. The second discusses the principles of John Locke on men and government. The third describes changing from a strategy based on realism to one of idealism. The fourth presents a theory of behavior termed “individual relativism” that relates needs and desires to an individual’s expectations. The fifth and final part briefly elaborates on some of the socio-economic factors that have a large impact on democratic consolidation. In short, the primary intent of this section is to highlight the importance of the switch from a philosophy espousing realism to one of idealism in order to consolidate the democratic state.

The Analogy of State Building and Childhood Development

Democratization of a nation-state is not unlike the development of a child into a responsible adult. This analogy is not to say that failed states or warlords are childlike. The analogy simply provides an example of how forceful means that may be productive during some phases of democratization, may not be effective in later stages. The child represents the failed state in a chaotic condition and the intervening forces under a U.N. mandate as the parents. In the early stages of development, the child depends heavily upon parental guidance. Parents use their power to establish security for the child and provide for his basic needs. The tantrums of a young child are met with the overwhelming power of the adult. As the child enters school, he learns responsible social behavior and becomes more autonomous. As the child gets older, the parents begin to

phase out their influence. Discipline that was effective to punish bad behavior at a young age may no longer be effective as the child becomes older; reason and logic become more important than physical discipline. Parents shelter their children from destructive influences throughout their development. During the teenage years, there is a backlash of demands for independence with which parents must cope. Forceful discipline is counter-productive in these years, and abusive punishment is never healthy. Eventually, the child matures and becomes independent but may still lean on the advice and support of his parents as the now young adult establishes roots in the real world and leaves behind parental protection.

This analogy makes two important points. The first point is that human development takes a long time. The time for a child to develop into a mature adult in a highly industrialized society may well take twenty years. On the other hand, the time for a political culture of a failed state to develop into a liberal democracy is difficult to ascertain--it is not based on a biological cycle. It may take at least a generation before democracy ever consolidates within a country. Democratization through international intervention requires time, commitment, and resources. The second point of the above analogy centers on the use of force in the democratic development. The employment of military force or the threat thereof by an intervening coalition of nations correlates to the stern discipline of the parent in early childhood. It is an important component of democratization that prevents radical groups and individuals from affecting the reconciliation process crucial to a stable environment. Military force is the backbone of the societal discipline needed in the early stages of political development. However, military force alone will not generate a societal discipline based on liberal principles and

may even prove counter productive in the later stages of development. Liberal, democratic societies result from a cultural transformation through a learning process that includes both education and experience. Kim Dae Jung writes on the development of Korean democracy:

[The military leaders] sacrificed democracy for the purpose of national security . . . and ignored the reality that genuine national security . . . works only when democracy is fully established and developed. . . . The democratic rights of the people were extremely restricted under National Security Law. Under the police force persecutors were forced to be servants of secret policemen and the military powers ruthlessly oppressed prodemocratic supporters. These democratic supporters were suppressed simply for their belief that a genuine democracy can be achieved only through political change.

The reason why political change for democracy has not been made is because the general population is lacking an awareness of a need for such change. The people are the true owners of democracy. Political change is impossible when the people do not stand up for their own rights.¹⁷

From Thomas Hobbes to the John Locke: The Evolution of the Social Contract

England's Thomas Hobbes developed the social contract theory in *Leviathan* in 1651. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes attempted to answer the question of why one man would ever voluntarily agree to submit himself to the authority of another individual or group of individuals. Hobbes logically presumed that the individual would only submit to the authority of another if he believed that by doing so his lot in life would be better. This in turn raised the question as to the natural state of man without civil society. Hobbes believed that before the formation of governments, man existed in a state of anarchy where he was continually at war, "Every man, against every man"¹⁸--a time of "no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, the continual fear and danger of violent death; the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."¹⁹ The social contract theory then stipulated that, given a choice, a typical person would give up his rights in

exchange for peace and security. Hobbes depicted good government as that with one supreme authority, preferably a monarchy. While Hobbes could tolerate government by legislative assembly alone, as opposed to an absolute monarchy, he thought that power in the assembly should be absolute and not shared.²⁰

John Locke, another Englishman, writing in *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*, held a more generous view of the nature of man. Locke maintained that the original state of nature was happy and characterized by reason and tolerance. He further maintained that all human beings, in their natural state, were equal and free to pursue life, health, liberty, and possessions and that these were inalienable rights. While Hobbes' state of nature was constant and unchanging, Locke's perception of man's nature was more consistent with the ideas of evolution. Man distinguished himself from the animals by his capacity to communicate and cooperate with one another, a capacity which evolved slowly over millions of years. The reason man would willingly accept the social contract is not to shake his brutish state but rather to advance his ends (peace and security) in a more efficient manner. To achieve his ends man gives up to the state a certain amount of his personal power and freedom.

Locke's view of the social contract theory was that man would put himself under government and follow its rules so long as said rules were fairly made and enforced. This arrangement is in the nature of a contract, an exchange. A citizen would be better able to secure liberty and property by giving up a little of each to a central authority. The idea of a social contract rests on the notion that an individual's liberty and property are better secured if men band together rather than if they are left alone, each to his own devices. Locke believed there was no need for government to have great powers, which, in his

opinion, would only be needed to keep people subservient. He also recognized the danger of leaving absolute power to any one individual, or group of individuals. Locke supposed that a government's power was best limited by dividing government up into branches, with each branch having only as much power as needed for its proper function.

Locke insisted not only that the public welfare was the true test of good government and the basis for properly imposing obligations on the citizens of a country but, also, that the public welfare made government necessary. In his work, Locke describes natural laws and natural rights, which he uses to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate civil governments and the right of people to revolt against tyrannical governments.

In relating these ideas to warlords and democratization, Hobbes's model of the state of nature manifests itself in the failed state environment. Once the intervening force strips the warlords of their power, the interim government becomes a representative government. The interim government of moderate social leaders is not the leviathan with absolute power, but the agent serving the welfare of the society at large. Peace and security are still the premier functions of the government; however, in a conflict between the individual and the state, it is the function of government to protect an individual's rights of liberty and property, not the state's internal power.

Realism to Idealism

As stated earlier, realism appears to be the best theory with which to design an effective strategy in the initial phases of democratization. Early interventions are driven by the power of the I.C. against the power of a corrupt system of warlords. Only by overwhelming power is the intervening force able to develop the society's trust and

acceptance of the new government. Failed state societies clearly lack the capacity to implement grandiose liberal ideals. Idealism and its lofty principles do not initially have a place in reforming an environment ruled at the point of a gun.

However, a democratization strategy that solely focuses on power misses the liberal ideals of democracy that Locke espouses. Eventually, the realist theories on power must be transformed into the idealist theories of morality that make up good government - government for the people and by the people based on individual liberty, democracy, and the free market. A strong democracy comes from both individual freedom and the respect for others. Democracy brings about order and stability by guaranteeing the rights of individuals. There is a degree of irony in the strength of a democracy; the same freedoms that bring stability are those that cause instability. Democracy allows citizens to openly criticize the government, organize opposition parties, and arrange for political protests. These political freedoms and human rights brought about too early can create political chaos and a return of an authoritarian regime that promises order and security. However, a society that embodies these principles brings about the peaceful acceptance of the rights of all, which are the source of the democratic peace initiative that the U.S. security strategy hopes to achieve. Throughout the transition and consolidation period, the democratization strategy must strike a balance between the principles of freedom, equality, and order.

Individual Relativism

There is a difference between the needs, desires, and expectations of individuals that elicit happiness. People are the same by birth. We are all born with same innate needs and desires. However, Maslow's theory overlooks the critical connection between

the fulfillment of innate needs and desires with the expectations resulting from one's environment. In many ways, expectations rather than our needs drive our emotional response to stimuli. This is why culture has such a strong effect on behavior. Each individual's own cultural environment shapes his perceptions, values, and judgments. For example, compare a very wealthy person like Donald Trump with a poor, blue-collar worker. The degree of happiness that either feels is not necessarily dependent on the stimuli. Trump's happiness or ambivalence to certain stimuli is totally dependent on the expectations that he has of his environment. Let us suppose the worker is tipped a hundred-dollars and, as a result, feels a sense of euphoria. Compare his response to Donald Trump's response to the receipt of a hundred-dollar check from a stock dividend. Assume Trump hardly takes notice of the extra money because of his great wealth. The emotional state, happiness or sadness, can not only be a result of an inability to satisfy a need, but an inability to satisfy a need to a level of each individual's expectation. The hundred-dollars in this example is the stimulus. It made one individual very happy, while barely stirring the interest of the other individual. In this discussion of needs and expectations, there is an element of rising expectations when it comes to an individual's response to stimuli. The worker's euphoria over receiving the first hundred-dollar bill may taper off when he receives the second, third, or fourth hundred-dollar bill. However, try and take away any amount of his reward to which he now feels entitled and he will fiercely resist.

How does this relate to freedom? If a citizen has no expectation of individual freedom or human rights, he may not be unhappy or frustrated. However, take an individual who lives in a free country and place that individual in that same repressive

environment. That person will become frustrated and may choose to revolt against the tyrannical system even at the cost of his personal safety. The case of South Korea illustrates this point. The South Korean government resembled more of an authoritarian regime than democracy during the 1960s through 1980s. General Wickham, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) commander in the late 1970s through early 1980s, was surprised that more people did not rise up and revolt against the repressive governments of South Korean Presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. Protests were generally limited to university students. After a major crack down on university protestors at Kwangju in 1980, General Wickham wrote, "I really expected more outrage by the Korean people at their loss of freedom [and was] surprised by the general passivity of the Korean people."²¹ If one is not accustomed to political freedom, then there is no expectation for this liberty. However, once enlightened to democratic freedoms and values, like the Korean university students, the state's withdrawal of these rights creates dissension and frustration.

Socioeconomic Factors

The final topic of this section covers the social and economic elements of democratization. Clearly, there are a plethora of issues involved in the cultural transformation of a failed state. Engineering democratic values in a society not accustomed to these freedoms is a difficult and complex task. Although the primary question of this thesis focuses on the strategy for dealing with warlords, there are three additional ideas relevant to the democratization of failed states that should be addressed. First, the focus of building democratic values must be at the grass roots level within the local communities. Second, the intervening force should not necessarily refrain from

imposing certain cultural values considered absolute moral truths found in the U.N charter on human rights. Third, there is a strong connection between liberalism and the growth of a commercial class.

Building Democracy in the Local Communities

The power of democracy is ultimately in the hands of the people, not a small educated elite. However, the educated elite does have an important role in helping to enlighten the common people about their rights and responsibilities as citizens in a democracy. The efforts of the international forces should focus on empowering the local communities to the democratic process and building a loose confederacy of regional governorships for the central state government. This is vital in pluralistic societies for two reasons. First, as a result of the brutal repressive measures by the authoritarian regimes preceding failed states, there is likely to be a general reluctance of the people to establish another powerful central government. The transition from a fractured society to a united society with a national identity may require a significant amount of time to build trust in the different factions within the country. Second, working from the bottom up provides a solid base for the continued development of democracy. Trying a top-down approach by empowering a small elite may be looked upon as an attempt to establish a puppet government or, worse, result in an assumption of power by this elite minority.

The primary weakness of a decentralized approach to state building is that the decentralization of power among regional governorships often works in the interests of the warlords. Designating warlords as governors in the early phase of intervention may, in fact, help stabilize the country in the short-run. However, these same warlords may frustrate the democratic transition for reasons discussed earlier in this paper. The press

reports evidence from the current mission in Afghanistan that the strategy of empowering warlords as regional governors is not working to build a stronger, more peaceful country.

At a time when the U.S. is promising a reconstructed democratic postwar Iraq, many Afghans are remembering hearing similar promises not long ago. Instead, what they see is thieving warlords, murder on the roads, and a resurgence of Taliban vigilantism. “It’s like I am seeing the same movie twice and no one is trying to fix the problem,” said Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of Afghanistan’s president and his representative in southern Kandahar. “What was promised to Afghans with the collapse of the Taliban was a new life of hope and change. But what was delivered? Nothing. Everyone is back in business.”²²

The solution may be to empower a representative council for the region as opposed to appointing a governor. This would also serve to reinforce the point of disarmament. The warlord governors in Afghanistan still maintain control of their armed militias that serve their personal interests and not society’s collective security interests.

Redefining Cultural Norms

There is a strong link to certain cultural norms described in chapter 2 that are conducive to democracy. In a talk to a group of Army officers on 9 April 2003 at Fort Leavenworth, Admiral Vern Clark, chief of U.S. Naval Operations, depicted cultural norms not as the amorphous quality of a group of people but as the collective behavior of an organization’s leaders. In many respects, the establishment of these norms is the most difficult part of democratization because of the uniqueness of each society. There simply isn’t a cookie-cutter approach to nation building; stimuli used to produce a positive result in one culture may be counterproductive in another. Despite the complexities, however, there are four cultural norms that need to be emphasized in the democratization process of a failed state. First is compromise. Conflicts are inevitable in the competition between individuals and groups over scarce resources and security. Leaders of fractured societies

need to learn to resolve their conflicts by negotiation and compromise, not by the means of violence. Second, states and government should serve the collective interest of society, not the other way around. Individuals do not live to serve the state; the state exists to serve individuals. Third, human rights are not earned through power. Instead, all human beings have natural rights that are inalienable, and governments are established to protect these rights. In failed states, individual rights are a result of power. In a liberal democracy, all individuals enjoy these basic human rights, regardless of one's individual power or stature. This is an important principle that must be reinforced in the new security organizations of the state.

Fourth, there are certain moral principles that all societies must observe. In an interview, a civil affairs officer said that the resident mullah, a local Islamic religious leader, largely dictated the laws in Afghanistan. Consequently, some mullah might tolerate such hideous acts as sodomizing a child. In this context right or wrong ultimately depends upon the mullah's interpretation of the Koran. "Imagine a fire erupting with your neighbor because he can not sodomize his six year old neighbor. The mullah says that it doesn't state in the Koran that this behavior is wrong, so he allows this behavior to occur. However, this same mullah then says that women can not drive because of his interpretation of the Koran. It is just simply inconsistent and wrong."²³ He went on to add that there are some who question imposing our own cultural values on another society. "What gives us the right to impose our values on the culture? . . . Our might makes it right in this case." Interestingly, this is exactly the same argument used by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue eons ago during the Peloponnesian War: Might makes right. However, leaders of international interventions have to carefully appraise what they

judge as absolute morality to avoid completely alienating the society in default. There has to be some accommodation and respect for the local values, but there are certain violations of international standards of behavior (like those found in the U.N. Charter and Universal Declaration on Human Rights) that are too abhorrent to tolerate.

Economic Link to Consolidation

The last aspect of democratization is the economic connection to democracy. There are three pieces to this discussion. First, there is a link between liberalism and the creation of a commercial class. Second, a free market economy reinforces democratic cultural norms. And, third, the intervening force must eliminate illegal revenue-generating enterprises with overwhelming force if necessary. Democracy implicitly promises happiness and economic prosperity by allowing people to lead lives according to their own self-interests. Their lives are no longer dominated by fear and coercion. The inability to meet such an expectation by a weak or failing economy is one of the quickest routes to rejecting democracy. Morgenthau writes in *Politics Among Nations*:

Attempts to establish a stable and peaceful international order is to be found in the increase in the humaneness and civilized character of human relations, which the last centuries have witnessed in the Western world. The philosophy of the Enlightenment and the political theory of liberalism postulated respect for human life and the promotion of human welfare. . . . The intellectual factor promoting this development is connected with the rise of the commercial classes first to social and then to political importance. With them rose to prominence the commercial and scientific spirit, which dreaded war and international anarchy as irrational disturbances of the calculable operations of the market.²⁴

This remark supports Huntington's observation that industrialized societies appear to be more apt to adopt liberal democracy than underdeveloped agrarian style economies. The interdependence of industry and the competitive nature of profits support the liberal cause. Primitive societies or failed states without an industrialized base have concepts for

generating wealth that are different from those of industrialized countries. Therefore, the development of an industrialized economy, preferably through private investment, is an important factor in cementing any forced democratic values by the intervening force.

In his treatise, *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith promised that a free market system guaranteed prosperity by the absolute gains of trade. The free market, ideally governed by the supply and demand of goods and services, creates a more efficient economy because of the competitive practice of individuals seeking to maximize his or her profit. In this way, the free market supports the liberal ideals of allowing individuals to determine this for themselves, not at the direction of state quotas and price controls. In general, people will want to work hard for a better life, as long as there is an expectation of a reasonable wage and low inflation (that his money will be worth something at the end of the day.)

The free market system is not perfect, and state governments can affect the system in both positive and negative ways. The state has the responsibility to establish rules for fair competition and many advanced countries provide a public welfare net for minimum survival. However, the welfare net is a dangerous remedy. In much the same way, international aid can have the unintended consequences of removing the market incentive to work. For instance, Somali food aid in Operation Restore Hope destroyed any market incentives for the farmers to toil at their fields.²⁵

Lastly, the intervening force and developmental agencies such as USAID should support economic programs that foster legitimate industries. Emerging democracies will have to eliminate illegitimate industries in order to earn the respect of the I.C. USAID helps in this effort by providing incentives for the new state to enforce laws against these

illegal activities. For instance, state agricultural programs should support legitimate crops, not the drug trade. This can be a tough sell for a farmer that may realize a greater profit in selling a crop such as opium rather than wheat.

The problems of illegal industries are usually directly tied to warlords aiming to generate revenue to support their own power base by any means available. Warlords are almost always connected to these illegal industries, which only include drug trafficking but also black market goods, counterfeit media, and money laundering. Warlords involved with the drug trade in Afghanistan make an estimated 50,000 to 90,000 U.S. dollars each year on the opium trade.²⁶ “There are limited attempts [by the coalition] to shut it down, but there is no impetus on their side [the warlords] to do this.”²⁷ This becomes yet another challenge for the intervening force. As aid organizations and the legitimate interim authorities attempt to convert these illegal industries into legitimate endeavors, there is a high likelihood that the warlords, still controlling an armed militia, will attempt to interfere. In such an instance, the intervening force would be required to provide protection for the civilian officials and mitigate this threat by destroying the warlord’s forces.

Conclusion

The process of democratization in a failed state is a uniquely complex process. State and societies collapsed under the pressure of the power struggle between armed groups of politically charged leaders known as warlords. Everything in the failed state environment depends upon raw power. As we attempt to define this political environment, the theory of realism, with an actor’s interests strictly defined in terms of power, provides a theoretical basis for an accurate understanding of warlords. The

application of realism then helps the I.C. craft an effective democratization strategy that deals with the warlords from this perspective of power.

This chapter provides a more in-depth discussion of warlords and democracy and concludes with an analysis focusing on four points of democratization and warlordism. First, individual behavior is a product of both instinctive needs and environmental expectations. Second, a secure and stable environment suitable for democratization cannot exist until the warlords' militias are disarmed and demobilized. Third, an effective democratization strategy balances the principles of freedom, order, and equality and continually evolves to meet the collective interests of the society. Fourth, democracy must be able to deliver economic progress and the hope of a better tomorrow in order to sustain its acceptance as an effective form of government

¹ Oakley, 123.

² Ibid., 122.

³ Ibid., C-2.

⁴ Dempsey and Fontaine, 50.

⁵ John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. by Frank Edgar Farley (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1898.), 3.

⁶ I remember this comment from among the many discussions I had over in the Balkans with my fellow officers. I cannot recall exactly who said this. Anonymous.

⁷ LTC Robert R. Pritchard II, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer in Afghanistan, telephone interview by author, 15 April 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 424.

¹⁰ A.J. Bacevich, "Learning from Aided: Military Strategy of Mohammed Farah Aided in Somalia. Where, When, and How to use force," *Commentary* 96, no. 6 (December 1993): 30-33.

¹¹ Andrew S Nastios, *Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies*, reprinted as Lesson 19, Reading A for C500 Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting, Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2002), L-19-A-5.

¹² William J. Clinton, "U.S. Military Involvement in Somalia," U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 42 (18 October 1993): 714.

¹³ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Crisis in Somalia: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 17 December 1992.

¹⁴ MAJ Laurence interview.

¹⁵ MAJ Thomas Sheehan, U.S. Army Infantry Branch, personal interview by author, 25 February 2003, Bell Hall, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

¹⁶ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, Intervention: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998) 118.

¹⁷ Kim Dae Jung, *Democracy in Asia*, [document online]; available from <http://www.nancho.net/fdlap/kdjtalk.html>; Internet; assessed 30 April 2003.

¹⁸ Hobbes, 105.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Peter Landry, *Biographies: Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)*, [biography online]; available from <http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Hobbes.htm>; Internet; 30 April 2003; 1.

²¹ John A. Wickham, *Korea on the Brink* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 104.

²² Earthlink international news story on 7 April 2003, *Taliban Reviving Structure in Afghanistan*, [document online]; available from http://start.earthlink.net/newsarticle?cat=7&aid=D7Q8J1V80_story; Internet; accessed 30 April 2003.

²³ LTC Pritchard interview.

²⁴ Morgenthau, 382.

²⁵ Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War* (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.), 42-44.

²⁶ LTC Pritchard interview.

²⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research studies the strategic policy of democratization in failed states; countries dominated by a small number of powerful warlords. Failed states are countries that have been torn apart by civil war and exist largely in a state of chaos and anarchy. Under pressure from warlords and their armed militias, state governments and institutions collapsed leaving behind broken societies. As state institutions disintegrated, warlords and their factions replaced law and order with force and terror. Warlords often pursued protracted campaigns against one another in battles for power. As long as warlords remain in power, this tragic state of affairs offers little hope for peace and stability for the citizens of the country.

The rise of failed states in the last years of the twentieth century was largely the result of two factors--the fall of communism and the forces of globalization. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of financial and military support to many authoritarian regimes. Globalization came about as a result of the rapid increases in communications technology and the free flow of capital, goods and services. Consequently, state borders became less significant, and there has been an increase in global cultural norms and the adherence to international laws. As a result of increasingly interdependent economies, modern societies favored peace and stability and supported global institutions that attempted to preserve a peaceful environment between states.

However, globalization and collapse of communist rule has caused instability and turmoil within many authoritarian states. Globalization and democratization offered hope to many repressed societies and inspired opposition movements within many of these

countries. Authoritarian regimes primarily responded to the growing discontent in one of three ways. Some states peacefully split into smaller states. Other governments embarked on a liberalization campaign, which transformed their systems into forms of democratic government. However, other states resorted to force in an attempt to crush the opposition. Authoritarian regimes in weak states, clinging to power through fear and coercion, soon found themselves embroiled in violent civil war that quickly led to complete state collapse. Following state collapse, a failed state environment emerged.

These developments seemed to occur with some regional regularity. First, there was a wave of internal, and largely peaceful, transitions to democratic government in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Second, there was a wave of civil wars that erupted in many parts of Africa and Central Asia giving rise to failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan. These conflicts usually involved ethnic violence and religious intolerance, and resulted in many atrocities and gross human rights violations.

After the fall of communism in the late 1980s, U.S. officials began to debate which direction the national strategy should follow in this rapidly changing international environment. The strategy of containing the Soviet Union was no longer appropriate. There were some that preferred a less active, more isolationist position for the U.S., however, others favored a more active role that would use the unchallenged superpower status of the U.S. to increase the community of democratic nations.

In the early 1990s, President Clinton developed the strategy of Democratic Enlargement to meet the needs of a new international environment. According to Democratic Enlargement, the U.S. would actively expand the community of democratic nations through the U.N. This included the concept of nation building in failed states.

However, the failures of the UNOSOM II mission caused U.S. officials to lose confidence in the U.N. and its ability to manage nation-building operations. Failed states were tragic and disheartening but there was little support to reengage U.S. forces into missions with little hope of success in ending bitter and complex conflicts within these countries.

On 11 September 2001, this changed. Using Afghanistan as its training and operating base, Islamic terrorists executed a series of coordinated attacks on significant American targets. The subsequent U.S. intervention into Afghanistan revealed plans to develop and employ WMD as a means to achieve the terrorists' goal of destroying the U.S. and its Western allies. The violence and chaos associated with failed states were no longer confined to the internal power struggles within these societies. As a result of the threat of terrorism and WMD, failed states represented a real threat to the U.S. that can no longer be ignored. In order for the U.S. to get failed states back on their feet and on the road to recovery, international interventions and nation-building operations became a national priority.

American Internationalism, the new NSS of President Bush, seeks to use preemptive force to destroy terrorist networks and rebuild failed societies by the process of democratization. The strategy of bringing about peace and stability through democratic government is based on the logic of the democratic peace theory. This theory asserts that liberal democracy promotes the internal stability of a state by the universal respect for human rights and, furthermore, that democratic nations will not feel threatened by other democracies. Liberal democracy protects individual liberties and encourages a culture of compromise and toleration as opposed to the ethos of violence and coercion.

The challenge with the democratization of failed states is the dilemma that intervening forces face with regard to warlords. Strategies that accommodate or pacify warlords may help bring about stability in the short-term but be unable to transform the society into an environment conducive for democracy. Likewise, strategies that alienate and forcibly remove warlords from power may initially encounter violent resistance, but improve the society's long-term prospects. Effective strategies for dealing with this dilemma begin by understanding the warlords' interests.

This research used the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Abraham Maslow, and Hans Morgenthau to define the warlords' interests. According to their theories, warlords' interests are described primarily by the means to increase his personal power. There is little or no interest in power sharing or serving the needs of society. Therefore, there is an irreconcilable gap between the interests of democracy and the interests of warlords.

This paper recommends that a strong approach should be taken with warlords and their armed militias. Using the concept of realism, early interventions by an international coalition should use overwhelming power as necessary to establish a stable and secure environment and rid the threat of warlord violence from affecting societal reconciliation. However, this is only the first phase of democratization. In order to consolidate democracy, the intervening force must eventually adjust its philosophical position and transition from a realist strategy to an idealist strategy--one that focuses on liberal values and socioeconomic reforms. Democratization is a complex process that will likely take at least a generation before liberal values can consolidate in these broken societies. Liberal ideas will simply take a while to be established in societies so accustomed to distrust and rule by force and violence.

There are many areas for future research into this topic. First, this paper assumed that the democratic theory was a valid concept. As opposed to a pragmatic argument regarding effective democratization strategies with warlords, perhaps future research should evaluate whether democratization and the democratic peace theory are indeed valid for all societies. Second, the paper does not discuss the prioritization of efforts for assisting weak or failed states towards democracy. At the present time, there are too many weak or failed states for the U.S. to become embroiled in every conflict. Subsequent research should focus on the global security environment and determine which states pose the greatest threat to the U.S. and decide which require preemptive regime change and nation building. Third, this paper did not address the last phase of democratization, the idealist phase, in great detail. Future research should focus on the socioeconomic programs best suited for failed states. These programs should help broken societies consolidate their democratic transitions into free and stable liberal democracies. Last, as an Army officer, the size and structure of the U.S. armed forces should be researched to determine how best to resource the strategy of American Internationalism. The current events unfolding in Iraq show that despite the initial military victory, the democratization phase in Iraq will require a significant military presence. In fact, it may require more forces than those needed to topple the Iraqi regime. Democratization will also take much longer than the forced entry phase of these types of missions.

Democratization is a tough mission and U.S. leaders should not be disillusioned when the process is not quick. Democratization and nation building will only succeed when the time, resources, and political will are available to complete these tasks.

However, success is more critical than ever if we are to move towards a new era of global peace and prosperity.

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